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I. INTRODUCTION 
A century ago the common law doctrine of contributory negligence 
was the universal rule of tort loss allocation in the various states and 
territories of the United States.  The doctrine completely barred a 
contributorily negligent plaintiff from any recovery against a negligent 
defendant.1  Criticism of the harshness of the doctrine led first to an array 
of exceptions designed to ameliorate its harsh results and then to the 
gradual adoption of comparative fault.2  In 1910, Mississippi became the 
first state to adopt a comparative fault system.3  At first, other states were 
slow to follow Mississippi’s lead, but gradually momentum grew; by the 
end of the century forty-six states, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands had all adopted some system of comparative fault.4  Only 
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 1. See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233–34 
(1908); Leon Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 36 (1944); Fleming James, Jr., 
Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 691 (1953); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of 
Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 151–53 (1946); William L. Prosser, Comparative 
Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1953). 
 2. See Brian P. Dunigan & Jerry J. Phillips, Comparative Fault in Tennessee: Where Are We 
Going, and Why Are We in This Handbasket?, 67 TENN. L. REV. 765, 770 (2000); Paul T. Hayden, 
Butterfield Rides Again: Plaintiff’s Negligence as Superseding or Sole Proximate Cause in Systems 
of Pure Comparative Responsibility, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 887, 888–90 (2000); Joseph W. Little, 
Eliminating the Fallacies of Comparative Negligence and Proportional Liability, 41 ALA. L. REV. 
13, 20–25 (1989); James, supra note 1, at 730–31; Wex S. Malone, Comparative Negligence—
Louisiana’s Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125, 141–42 (1945); Ernest A. Turk, Comparative 
Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 203 (1950). 
The terms “comparative negligence” and “comparative fault” are used interchangeably in this 
Article.  “Comparative fault” is probably the more accurate description because the substantial 
majority of states have applied their statutes to some form of fault beyond negligence.  For example, 
many comparative fault states apply comparative fault to strict product liability actions.  See VICTOR 
E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 11.02 (5th ed. 2010). 
 3. HENRY WOODS & BETH DEERE, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1.11 (3d ed. 1996); see MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (West 2008). 
 4. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, § 1.11. 
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Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia had failed to adopt any system of comparative fault.5 
In foreign nations,6 in maritime law,7 and in the United States at the 
federal level,8 legislatures and courts adopted “pure” comparative fault in 
which a negligent plaintiff could recover a proportionate fault share of 
his damages regardless of how great the plaintiff’s share of the total 
fault.  The 90%-at-fault plaintiff could recover 10% of his damages from 
the 10%-at-fault defendant.9  Among the various states and territories of 
the United States, only twelve states10 and Puerto Rico11 have adopted 
pure comparative fault. 
                                                     
 5. See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1980) (retaining the contributory 
negligence rule); Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 905 (Md. 1983) 
(retaining the contributory negligence rule); Duval v. OM Hospitality, LLC, 651 S.E.2d 261, 264 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (applying the contributory negligence rule); Rascher v. Friend, 689 S.E.2d 661, 
664–65 (Va. 2010) (applying the contributory negligence rule); Burton v. United States, 668 F. 
Supp. 2d 86, 107 (D.D.C. 2009) (retaining the contributory negligence rule). 
 6. See generally Frank E. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed 
Law Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 135, 152–54 (1958) (describing the history and adoption of 
proportional allocation of loss in negligence cases in several foreign countries); A. Chalmers Mole & 
Lyman P. Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 337–38 (1932) 
(explaining the proportional fault laws of various other countries); Turk, supra note 2, at 230–31 
(describing the history and adoption of a proportional division of damages rule by the Brussels 
Maritime Convention of 1909–10, which was ratified by nearly all important nations). 
 7. See generally Alfred Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at Sea, 13 
CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928) (sketching the origin and development of the admiralty collision damage 
rule); Mole & Wilson, supra note 6, at 339–59 (discussing the proportionate damages rule in 
admiralty); George C. Sprague, Divided Damages, 6 N.Y.U. L. REV. 15 (1928) (tracing the origin 
and development of the apportionment rule of damages in admiralty and maritime torts); Turk, supra 
note 2, at 230–31.  The United States Supreme Court judicially adopted pure comparative fault for 
ship collision cases governed by maritime law in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 
397, 411 (1975). 
 8. See 45 U.S.C. § 53 (2006); 46 U.S.C. § 30304 (2006). 
 9. See infra notes 81–99 and accompanying text. 
 10. Seven states adopted pure comparative fault by judicial decision.  See Kaatz v. State, 540 
P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. 
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 719–20 (Ky. 1984); Placek 
v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Mich. 1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 
15 (Mo. 1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981).  Five states enacted pure 
comparative fault by statute.  See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 
(West 2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (CONSOL. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-20-4 (West 2006); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 2005).  The Michigan legislature subsequently enacted a 
comparative fault statute that retained pure comparative fault for economic losses but enacted the 
50% rule for non-economic losses.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2959 (West 2010). 
Illinois and Iowa also judicially adopted pure comparative fault.  See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 
N.E.2d 886, 896–97 (Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Iowa 1982).  The 
legislature in each state subsequently enacted a statute with the 50% rule of modified comparative 
fault.  735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116(c) (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(b) (West 
1998 & Supp. 2010). 
 11. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1991). 
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The substantial majority of states plus the Virgin Islands and Guam 
have adopted a hybrid system of modified comparative fault in which the 
comparative fault loss allocation ends and the total bar of contributory 
negligence is reimposed once the plaintiff’s fault rises to a certain level.  
Twenty-one states12 and the Virgin Islands13 have adopted the so-called 
50% rule system of modified comparative fault.  Under this rule, the 
plaintiff may recover a proportionate fault share of his damages only so 
long as his fault is “not greater than” the defendant’s fault.  If the 
plaintiff’s fault exceeds 50% of the total fault, he is completely barred 
from any recovery.  Twelve states14 and Guam15 have adopted the so-
called 49% rule system of modified comparative fault.  Under this rule, 
the plaintiff may recover a proportionate fault share of his damages only 
so long as his fault is “less than” the defendant’s fault.  The plaintiff who 
is 49% at fault may recover 51% of his damages from the 51%-at-fault 
defendant,16 but he is completely barred from any recovery if both he and 
the defendant are each 50% at fault.17  One state—South Dakota—has 
the “slight negligence” system in which the plaintiff may recover a 
proportionate fault share of his damages only so long as the trier of fact 
                                                     
 12. South Carolina adopted the 50% rule by judicial decision.  See Nelson v. Concrete Supply 
Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991).  Twenty states enacted the 50% rule by statute.  See CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (West 2006); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 663-31 (West 2008); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116; IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 
(West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 668.1–668.10 (West 1998 & Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-
1-702 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d 
(2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.35 (West 2004); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.60 (West Supp. 2009); 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.  
§ 33.001 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 
(West 2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (West 2007). 
 13. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (1997). 
 14. Tennessee and West Virginia adopted the 49% rule by judicial decision.  See McIntyre v. 
Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting the 49% rule); Bradley v. Appalachian Power 
Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. Va. 1979) (adopting same).  Ten states enacted the 49% rule by 
statute.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 (West 
2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (2005 & Supp. 2010); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.09 (2009); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-02 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818 (West 2009). 
 15. 18 GUAM CODE ANN. § 90108 (2010). 
 16. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Twp. Trs. Of Salem Twp., 582 P.2d 271, 273 (Kan. 1978) 
(finding plaintiff 49% at fault after jury received instruction on the legal effects of its percentage of 
fault findings). 
 17. See, e.g., Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Neosho Const. Co., 192 F.R.D. 662 (D. Kan. 2000) (“[I]f 
plaintiff’s fault was 50 per cent or more, Plaintiff will not receive damages.”  (citing Nail v. Doctor’s 
Bldg., Inc., 708 P.2d 186, 187–89 (Kan. 1985))). 
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finds the plaintiff’s negligence to be “slight” in comparison to the 
negligence of the defendant.18  The meaning of slight is deemed not 
capable of precise definition,19 and the issue is generally left to the trier 
of fact.20  Apparently, the jury is free to characterize the plaintiff’s 
negligence as slight so long as it is less than the negligence of the 
defendant.21  As with the 49% rule, the plaintiff is completely barred 
from any recovery if his negligence is equal to or greater than the 
defendant’s negligence. 
Criticism of modified comparative fault is generally divided into two 
broad categories.  First, courts and commentators have criticized 
modified comparative fault for reviving the harsh bar of contributory 
negligence, albeit at a higher level,22 and producing disproportionate 
allocation of tort losses.23  Dean William Prosser viewed modified 
comparative fault as merely the result of political compromise.24  
                                                     
 18. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-1, 20-9-2 (2004).  Both South Dakota and Nebraska 
originally enacted the “slight-gross” system which allowed plaintiff a comparative fault recovery 
only when plaintiff’s negligence was “slight” in comparison with defendant’s “gross” negligence.  
Otherwise, plaintiff was completely barred by his contributory negligence.  See, e.g., Ries v. Daffin 
Corp., 131 N.W.2d 577, 579 (S.D. 1964) (“Where the evidence . . . is such that reasonable minds 
might differ as to the existence of slight negligence on the one hand and gross negligence on the 
other, the question of comparison is for the jury.” (quoting Flanagan v. Slattery, 49 N.W.2d 27, 29 
(S.D. 1951))).  South Dakota amended its statute in 1964 to eliminate the requirement that 
defendant’s negligence be “gross.”  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-2.  Nebraska amended its statute in 
1992 to substitute the 49% rule in place of the “slight-gross” rule.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.09. 
 19. See Am. State Bank v. List-Mayer, 350 N.W.2d 44, 47 (S.D. 1984) (“[T]he term ‘slight’ 
negligence . . . defies precise definition and prohibits an arbitrary mathematical ratio.” (quoting 
Crabb v. Wade, 167 N.W.2d 546, 549 (S.D. 1969))). 
 20. See Schmidt v. Royer, 574 N.W.2d 618, 627 (S.D. 1998) (leaving the issue of contributory 
negligence to the jury because the facts were in dispute whether “either driver committed negligence 
more than slight”); cf. Musilek v. Stober, 434 N.W.2d 765, 768 (S.D. 1989) (finding that there was 
no error in not submitting the issue of what constitutes “slight negligence” to the jury because the 
court found plaintiff’s contributory negligence was more than slight in comparison with that of the 
defendant). 
 21. Plaintiff’s negligence is to be compared with the negligence of the defendant and not with 
the conduct of the reasonable prudent person.  Schmidt, 574 N.W.2d at 627; Musilek, 434 N.W.2d at 
768.  “Whether a plaintiff’s negligence is slight compared to that of the defendant is a question of 
fact and varies with the facts and circumstances of each case.”  Estate of Largent v. United States, 
910 F.2d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Urban v. Wait’s Supermarket, Inc., 294 N.W.2d 793, 796 
(S.D. 1980)). 
 22. See Dunigan & Phillips, supra note 2, at 791; see also Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 
1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ill. 1981); Placek v. City of Sterling 
Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Mich. 1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (N.M. 1981); 
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992). 
 23. See Arthur Best, Impediments to Reasonable Tort Reform: Lessons from the Adoption of 
Comparative Negligence, 40 IND. L. REV. 1, 7–10 (2007); Maloney, supra note 6, at 169; see also 
Li, 532 P.2d at 1243; Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 753–54 (Iowa 1982); Kirby v. Larson, 
256 N.W.2d 400, 428 (Mich. 1977); Scott, 634 P.2d at 1241. 
 24. Prosser, supra note 1, at 25. 
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Second, courts and commentators criticized the 49% rule of modified 
comparative fault in particular as likely to produce harsh and unexpected 
results when juries find the parties equally at fault in the expectation of 
dividing the damage between plaintiff and defendant, only to then 
discover that the plaintiff was barred from all recovery.25 
The surprise has always been the relatively limited response to these 
criticisms.  Courts and commentators have suggested two justifications 
for modified comparative fault.  First, it reflects principles of tort loss 
allocation that evolved under the former all-or-nothing system.26  Second, 
it avoids the problems created by allowing tort claims to be pursued by 
highly culpable plaintiffs.27  Lost in these arguments for and against 
modified comparative fault is one fairly simple point: the appropriateness 
of either 49% or 50% as the only cutoff points at which comparative 
fault allocation ends and the complete bar to recovery of contributory 
negligence is reimposed.  Nothing in the literature has explored the 
possibility of a different—and higher—cutoff point.28  While state 
legislatures have shown remarkable imagination in enacting compromise 
positions between the extremes of joint and several liability on the one 
hand and proportionate liability on the other,29 only Texas has adopted—
and has since repealed—a different cutoff point for modified 
comparative fault.  In actions based on strict tort liability, strict products 
liability, or breach of warranty, Texas formerly used a 60% cutoff of 
comparative fault allocation,30 while retaining its 50% rule for ordinary 
negligence actions.31  All other modified comparative fault states 
                                                     
 25. See Dunigan & Phillips, supra note 2, at 794–95; Stuart F. Schaffer, Comment, Informing 
the Jury of the Legal Effect of Special Verdict Answers in Comparative Negligence Actions, 1981 
DUKE L.J. 824, 830–32. 
 26. See infra notes 35–44 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. 
 28. Occasionally commentators make a passing reference to a higher cutoff point as part of 
another argument, but never in the context of a proposal for adopting such a cutoff point.  See, e.g., 
David C. Sobelsohn, “Pure” vs. “Modified” Comparative Fault: Notes on the Debate, 34 EMORY 
L.J. 65, 82 n.92 (1985) (asking “[w]hy draw the line at 99% instead of 90%, 80%, or 50%” in 
response to a suggestion by a proponent of pure comparative fault that a claim by a 99% at fault 
plaintiff could be automatically dismissed).  The only serious commentary seems to have been an 
observation by a committee of the Missouri Bar that denial of compensation was unfair in cases of 
plaintiffs whose fault was determined to be at or above 60%.  Norman O. Sanders et al., The Status 
of Comparative Fault in Missouri, reprinted in SECOND INTERIM REPORT OF THE TORT REVIEW 
COMMITTEE OF THE MISSOURI BAR TOGETHER WITH RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUPPORTING PAPERS 
81, 83 (1986). 
 29. See infra notes 51–65 and accompanying text. 
 30. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001(b) (1987) (amended 1995). 
 31. See id. § 33.001(a).  Michigan has also departed from the norm by adopting a hybrid form 
of comparative fault in which pure comparative fault governs economic losses while the 50% rule 
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continue to maintain a cutoff point between comparative fault loss 
allocation and the complete bar of contributory negligence at or just 
below 50%. 
This modest paper will address the possibility of an alternative to the 
49% or 50% cutoff point.  For many years, I have proposed to my first-
year torts students the 83.7% system of modified comparative fault.  In 
any action in which both plaintiff and defendant were at fault, the loss 
would be allocated on a comparative fault basis with only two 
exceptions.  First, any plaintiff whose fault exceeded 83.7% of the total 
fault would be barred from any recovery.  Second, any defendant whose 
fault exceeded 83.7% of the total fault would be barred from obtaining 
any comparative fault reduction of his liability to the plaintiff or any 
other reduction of his liability based on the fault of another defendant.  In 
short, any party whose fault exceeded 83.7% bears the full burden of the 
loss occasioned by the accident. 
Invariably students respond that 83.7% is a completely arbitrary 
number deserving no credence.  I assure them that they are half correct.  
The number is arbitrary.  It could as easily be 68.1% or 76.9% or 88.4%.  
I chose 83.7% solely because I believe the high cutoff point offers on 
balance more virtue than sin.  The specific number, however, is not the 
issue.  The issue is whether 83.7% or some comparable number is more 
or less arbitrary than the 49% or 50% number used in all existing 
modified comparative fault systems.  I submit that the 49% and 50% 
numbers are exceedingly arbitrary for at least three reasons.  First, they 
draw a line between parties whose faults are either identical or 
essentially similar, assigning some to the winners’ category and others to 
the losers’ category without any sound reason for the discrimination.32  
Second, they make equitable loss allocation in most two-party, two-
injury cases virtually impossible.33  Third, they force courts to address 
procedural issues created by or exacerbated by modified comparative 
fault.34 
Part II of this Article will discuss whether any existing policies of 
tort loss allocation support the continued adherence to either the 49% or 
50% cutoff point.  The discussion will focus on (1) the policies and 
principles developed under the all-or-nothing system and (2) the policies 
that in the view of some courts or commentators make pure comparative 
fault an undesirable alternative.  Part III will discuss the appropriateness 
                                                                                                                       
governs non-economic losses.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2959 (West 2010). 
 32. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 167–83 and accompanying text. 
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of an unusual number as the point at which to cut off comparative fault 
loss allocation and revert to the complete bar of contributory negligence.  
A brief examination of seemingly unusual lines drawn by states in 
limiting the scope of joint and several liability will demonstrate the 
diverse policy choices that may influence tort loss allocation.  Part IV 
will discuss the affirmative benefits of a significantly higher cutoff point 
such as 83.7%.  The discussion will examine how a higher cutoff point 
resolves problems concerning (1) the discriminatory effect of a cutoff 
point drawn between very similar faults, (2) equitable loss allocation in 
two-party, two-injury actions, and (3) procedures developed to offset the 
inequitable consequences of the existing modified comparative fault 
systems.  Finally, Part V will discuss the benefits of the two-way 
provision, which imposes on a highly culpable defendant the entire cost 
of an accident. 
II. THE LACK OF A PERSUASIVE RATIONALE FOR EXISTING SYSTEMS OF 
MODIFIED COMPARATIVE FAULT 
The appropriateness of a significantly higher cutoff point between 
comparative and contributory negligence in part depends on the 
existence and strength of the justifications for the 49% and 50% systems 
of modified comparative fault.  Proponents of the existing systems of 
modified comparative fault suggest two closely-related justifications.  
First, the existing systems might be viewed as based upon certain 
principles carried over from the all-or-nothing system.  Second, they 
might be viewed as necessary to avoid certain problems perceived as 
inherent in pure comparative fault. 
A. Principles of the All-or-Nothing System 
The contributory negligence rule provided that when the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff, however slight, combined with the negligence 
of the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff, plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence constituted a complete bar to any recovery from the negligent 
defendant.35  The rule originated in 1809 in Butterfield v. Forrester36 and 
dominated English and American tort law until the middle of the 
twentieth century.37  The rule was criticized as harsh because it put on 
                                                     
 35. See supra note 1. 
 36. (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.) 11 East 60. 
 37. See generally James, supra note 1; Maloney, supra note 6; Prosser, supra note 1.  Much of 
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one party, the plaintiff, the entire burden of an accident caused by the 
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant.38  Moreover, this 
harshness was exacerbated by the rule’s application regardless of how 
slight the plaintiff’s contribution.39  Criticism of the harshness of the rule 
gradually led to a wide array of exceptions in which courts shifted the 
entire burden of the plaintiff’s injury to the defendant.40  Thus, the 
plaintiff recovered all his damages if one of the exceptions applied, but 
otherwise he recovered nothing.  The “all-or-nothing system” is a 
common reference to this system of tort loss allocation in which the 
burden of an injury caused by the fault of two or more parties was 
imposed on just one of those parties rather than shared among them. 
Two relevant and closely related principles of the all-or-nothing 
system governed the selection of which culpable party would bear the 
entire burden of the injury.  The first principle was that when the fault of 
both plaintiff and defendant was equal, the loss would fall on the 
plaintiff.  This result was consistent with the ancient maxim in pari 
delicto potior est conditio defendentis, or “in equal fault the position of 
the defendant is stronger.”41  Thus, the defendant prevailed and the 
plaintiff recovered nothing when both of them were negligent42 or both 
were reckless.43  No clear rationale for this principle exists,44 but in a 
                                                                                                                       
the support for the contributory negligence rule may be attributed to the subsequent industrial 
revolution with its rapid increase in claims by injured factory and railroad workers.  See Bohlen, 
supra note 1, at 254–55; James, supra note 1, at 695; Malone, supra note 1, at 152–55; Prosser, 
supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 38. See James, supra note 1, at 701 (1953) (“[T]he defense of contributory negligence offers 
amnesty to a careless defendant every time it administers a deterrent lash to a careless 
plaintiff . . . .”); see also Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (N.M. 1981); Turk, supra note 2, at 
199–202 (1950). 
 39. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437–38 (Fla. 1973); Turk, supra note 2, at 199–202. 
 40. See supra note 2.  Some commentators note that it is also unfair to impose the entire burden 
of an accident on the defendant when the accident was caused by the combined fault of both plaintiff 
and defendant.  See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 121 (2008); Prosser, 
supra note 1, at 8. 
 41. Under the “in pari delicto” doctrine, relief will be denied “where the parties are shown . . . 
to have acted with the same degree of knowledge as to the illegality of the transaction.  The law will 
leave the parties just in the condition in which it finds them.  In such a situation, therefore, the 
defendant is in the stronger position.”  27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 103 (2008).  It should be noted that 
the second “all-or-nothing” principle relevant to this Article has its roots in the stated limitation on 
the in pari delicto doctrine.  “Where the parties appear not to have been in pari delicto, however, the 
one whose wrong is less than that of the other may be granted relief.”  Id. 
 42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1965). 
 43. See id. § 482(2).  Cases on point are exceedingly rare.  See, e.g., Harlow v. Connelly, 548 
S.W.2d 143, 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Elliott v. Phila. Transp. Co., 53 A.2d 81, 83 (Pa. 1947).  
Tennessee courts have held that a plaintiff’s gross negligence is a defense to a defendant’s gross 
negligence.  See Hood v. Waldrum, 434 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968); Brown v. Barber, 174 
S.W.2d 298, 300 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943). 
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system in which one of two culpable parties will bear the entire burden 
of a loss, the maxim may serve to provide a starting point or rebuttable 
presumption that the burden should fall on the plaintiff. 
The second principle was that if the burden of loss is to fall entirely 
on one of two culpable parties, it should preferably fall on the more 
culpable party.45  The contributory negligence rule provided that 
contributory negligence, however slight, was a complete defense.  
Positing a lesser fault—no matter how slight—as a complete defense to a 
greater fault offended a basic sense of fairness, and judicial reaction to 
this unfairness led to most, if not all, of the many exceptions that over 
time weakened the contributory negligence rule and eventually set the 
stage for comparative fault. 
The first exceptions provided that plaintiff’s contributory negligence 
would not constitute a defense to categorically greater harms.  The 
traditional categories of tort liability ranging from the highest to the 
lowest culpability are (1) intentional, (2) willful, wanton, or reckless, (3) 
negligence, and (4) strict liability.46 
                                                                                                                       
 44. Courts had four choices in how to resolve this issue.  First, they could put the entire burden 
on the plaintiff.  The contributory negligence rule reflects this option.  Second, they could put the 
entire burden on the defendant.  Workers compensation reflects this option.  See Mole & Wilson, 
supra note 6, at 604–08.  Third, they could divide the loss.  For centuries, maritime law followed this 
option in the ship collision cases.  See Turk, supra note 2, at 220–31.  See also generally Sprague, 
supra note 7, at 15.  Finally, they could apportion the loss in proportion to the fault of the parties.  
The comparative fault option is now widely followed in the United States and internationally.  See 
supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
 45. This principle may have its roots in the limitation on the in pari delicto doctrine in 
situations where one party was less culpable than the other.  See supra note 41. 
 46. See infra Figure 1.  Strict liability is placed at the bottom of the figure because technically it 
involves liability without any fault.  The contributory negligence defense to strict liability actions, 
however, is limited to only that contributory negligence which overlaps assumption of risk.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965); id. § 524 (1976).  The heightened and 
sometimes unfamiliar dangers associated with those matters deemed appropriate for strict liability 
may explain the limited contributory negligence defense.  The scope of comparative fault defenses to 
strict liability are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Figure 1: Traditional Categories of Fault 
INTENTIONAL 




Both intentional misconduct and willful, wanton, or reckless 
misconduct are considered categorically more culpable than 
negligence.47  Accordingly, contributory negligence is not a defense to a 
defendant’s intentional tort48 or to a defendant’s willful, wanton, or 
reckless conduct,49 and in each instance, any contributory negligence of 
the plaintiff is ignored and the entire burden of loss falls on the 
defendant.  Both exceptions involve situations not technically within the 
basic parameters of the contributory negligence rule because the claim 
against the defendant is not based on mere negligence but on a different 
and more culpable category of fault.50 
The far more challenging problem involved application of this 
principle within the broad realm of negligence.  Conceptually, 
negligence is negligence, and the pari delicto principle would arguably 
govern in cases involving a contributorily negligent plaintiff and a 
                                                     
 47. See supra Figure 1.  Negligence is generally considered conduct that simply falls below the 
standard of reasonable care—carelessness.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965).  
By contrast, intentional misconduct involves engaging in conduct for the purpose of causing harm or 
with knowledge that the harm is substantially certain to occur.  Id. § 8A.  Recklessness is conduct 
which a reasonable person would realize that not only does it create “an unreasonable risk of 
physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary 
to make his conduct negligent.”  Id. § 500. 
 48. See id. § 481. 
 49. See id. § 482. 
 50. See supra note 45.  Occasionally courts have held that willful, wanton, or reckless conduct 
is merely different in degree from negligence, implying that it is a form of negligence rather than a 
separate category of fault.  See, e.g., Wilby v. Gostel, 578 S.E.2d 796, 801 (Va. 2003).  However, the 
prevailing view is that negligence “does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of 
others.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). 
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negligent defendant.  Yet in a more pragmatic sense, not all negligence is 
equal.  Negligence covers a vast range of human conduct from the highly 
culpable to the barely culpable.  Gradually courts found applications of 
the second principle wholly within the broad range of negligence and 
developed at least four categories of exceptions to the contributory 
negligence rule: (1) categorical disparity based on different subdivisions 
of negligence; (2) specific situations presumed to involve a disparity in 
fault; (3) disparity based on defendant’s violation of certain safety 
statutes; and (4) disparity based on situations presumed to involve de 
minimis fault by plaintiff.  The first two exceptions focused on highly 
culpable conduct by defendants, and the other two focused on minimally 
culpable conduct by plaintiffs. 
First, a few courts experimented with subdividing the broad realm of 
negligence into “slight” negligence, “ordinary” negligence, and “gross” 
negligence.51  This approach was not the “slight–gross” system of 
comparative fault adopted in Nebraska and South Dakota.52  Rather, it 
was an all-or-nothing approach in which the burden of loss would shift 
entirely to the defendant whose gross negligence combined with the 
plaintiff’s “slight” negligence to cause injury.53 
Figure 2: Categories of Fault with Subdivisions of Negligence 
INTENTIONAL 






                                                     
 51. See infra Figure 2; see also Green, supra note 1, at 45–53; Mole & Wilson, supra note 6, at 
334–36; Prosser, supra note 1, at 17–21. 
 52. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 53. See infra Figure 2.  The vastness of the range of conduct capable of being described as 
negligent made the range of conduct seemingly appropriate for subdivision and thus an extension of 
the principle that a lesser fault should not constitute a defense to a greater fault. 
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Conceptually, the approach was a sound extension of the rule that 
contributory negligence should not constitute a complete defense to 
defendant’s categorically greater fault.  The approach failed, however, 
because courts could not define “slight,” “ordinary,” and “gross” 
negligence with sufficient clarity to prevent endless appeals.54 
Second, perhaps the best example of a specific situation in which the 
defendant could be presumed to be consistently and significantly more 
culpable than the plaintiff is the last clear chance doctrine.55  In the 
classic case, the defendant is aware that his conduct poses a pending 
danger to the plaintiff, while the plaintiff is either unaware of the danger 
or no longer able to extricate himself from the danger.  If the defendant 
then fails to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to the plaintiff, 
any contributory negligence of the plaintiff is excused and the burden of 
the loss falls entirely on the defendant.56  The disparity in fault justifying 
the exception arose from the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable 
care after becoming aware of the danger and thus being the only party 
with a meaningful opportunity to prevent injury to the plaintiff.  The 
presumed disparity in relative fault is based on the nature of the 
defendant’s conduct as highly culpable, and in many cases, it seems to 
border on willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.57  Little attention is paid 
                                                     
 54. See Green, supra note 1, at 50–53; Malone, supra note 2, at 141; Prosser, supra note 1, at 
17–18.  Dean Green attributed the demise of the system to three problems.  First, it was incomplete 
because it shifted the entire burden of loss to defendant rather than merely mitigating plaintiff’s 
damages.  Green, supra note 1, at 48–49.  Second, the degrees of negligence approach was simply 
too confusing and difficult to administer.  Id. at 49–50.  Third, appellate courts preferred the 
contributory negligence rule because it gave them greater control over trial courts and juries in 
determining the outcome of cases.  Id. at 50–51. 
 55. The doctrine had its origin in Davies v. Mann, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Exch.) 10 M. & 
W. 546.  See Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 
707 (1938); Malcolm M. MacIntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1225, 
1225 (1940). 
 56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479–80 (1965). 
 57. In some cases the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care once he became aware that 
the plaintiff was in a position of peril and that the plaintiff was unaware of his peril.  See, e.g., 
Peterson v. Burkhalter, 237 P.2d 977, 979–80 (Cal. 1951) (applying the last clear chance doctrine 
when driver collided with child riding a motor scooter at an intersection because a reasonably 
prudent driver should have foreseen that the child might not turn or stop at the intersection); Bence 
v. Teddy’s Taxi, 297 P. 128, 129–30 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (applying the doctrine when a taxi 
cab struck a pedestrian because the pedestrian was unaware of his dangerous position but the driver 
had a clear chance to avoid the accident with ordinary care); Fuller v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 56 So. 
783, 789–90 (Miss. 1911) (applying the doctrine when company’s train struck a person driving a 
wagon who could not see the approaching train because the train’s driver could see the wagon and 
could have stopped the train but made no effort to do so); Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576, 585 
(Tenn. 1976) (applying the doctrine when an unaware pedestrian was struck by a car whose driver 
could have avoided the accident with ordinary care), abrogated by McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 
S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).  When the defendant was aware of plaintiff’s peril, the doctrine is 
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in the cases to the culpability of the plaintiff in getting into the position 
of danger in the first place. 
Third, a defendant’s violation of a routine safety statute, regulation, 
or ordinance will not normally negate a plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence.58  A violation will negate the plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence, however, if the statute, regulation, or ordinance has been 
“enacted in order to protect a certain class of persons against their own 
inability to protect themselves.”59  For example, a child’s contributory 
negligence would not be recognized as a defense to a defendant’s 
violation of a statute prohibiting the sale of firearms or explosives to 
minors60 or prohibiting their employment in certain dangerous 
situations61 if those statutes were intended to protect them from their own 
inexperience and lack of judgment.62  In these situations, the defendant is 
                                                                                                                       
sometimes called “conscious last clear chance.”  Compare Kasanovich v. George, 34 A.2d 523, 524 
(Pa. 1943) (involving a trolley car operator who, without ringing a warning bell, ran over a 
pedestrian walking on the tracks with his back to the trolley), with Davies, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589 
(involving a wagon driver who failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid running over a fettered 
donkey in the road).  Kasanovich was decided in plaintiff’s favor on the ground that contributory 
negligence is not a defense to willful, wanton, or reckless conduct, while Davies was decided on 
grounds that became known as last clear chance.  Kasanovich, 34 A.2d at 526; Davies, 152 Eng. 
Rep. at 590. 
The doctrine expanded to cover cases in which the plaintiff was no longer able to extricate 
himself from a position of peril and the defendant was inattentive and not actually aware of 
plaintiff’s position of peril.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 (1965).  This latter group 
of cases, sometimes called “unconscious last clear chance,” lacks a similar disparity of fault because 
defendant’s inattentiveness is ordinary negligence and the level of plaintiff’s culpability in getting 
into the position of peril in the first instance is not considered and not necessarily anything other 
than ordinary negligence. 
 58. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965).  For example, a state statute may 
prohibit driving a vehicle at an excessive or unreasonable speed, but a defendant’s violation of that 
provision would not excuse a plaintiff from exercising reasonable care for his own safety.  Id. § 483 
cmt. b. 
 59. Id. § 483 cmt. c. 
 60. See, e.g., Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421, 423–24 (Fla. 1959) (involving the 
sale of a rifle); Parman v. Lemmon, 244 P. 227, 231–32 (Kan. 1925) (recognizing the rule but 
declining to include a shotgun within the statutory definition of deadly weapon); see also Zerby v. 
Warren, 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1973) (involving the sale of glue to a minor). Contra Zamora v. 
J. Korber & Co., 278 P.2d 569, 571 (N.M. 1954) (involving the sale of a rifle). 
 61. See, e.g., Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 225 S.W. 887, 890 (Ark. 1920); Durden v. Caulkins, 
110 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (extending the rule to allow recovery for a father who 
let his under age son drive a motor scooter and sued when another driver hit his son); Louisville, H. 
& St. L. Ry. v. Lyons, 159 S.W. 971, 975 (Ky. 1913); Dusha v. Va. & Rainy Lake Co., 176 N.W. 
482, 483 (Minn. 1920); Karpeles v. Heine, 124 N.E. 101, 104 (N.Y. 1919); Lenahan v. Pittston Coal 
Mining Co., 67 A. 642, 643 (Pa. 1907).  Other cases have refused to permit a reduction of damages 
under comparative fault when child labor laws are violated.  See, e.g., Long v. Murnane Assoc., 416 
N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div. 1979); Strain v. Christians, 483 N.W.2d 783, 789 (S.D. 1992); D.L. v. 
Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 917–18 (Wis. 1983); Tisdale v. Hasslinger, 255 N.W.2d 314, 315–16 
(Wis. 1977). 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmts. c, e (1965). 
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deemed the more culpable party because of his greater ability to avoid 
the harm compared to the child plaintiff’s relative inability to avoid the 
harm, and thus the entire burden of loss falls on the defendant. 
Finally, courts created exceptions based on circumstances that would 
tend to support a characterization of the plaintiff’s fault as de minimis in 
nature.  Courts recognized that in certain situations the circumstances 
might make otherwise negligent conduct seem either non-negligent or at 
worst minimally negligent.  Thus, a sudden emergency, a rescue of one 
in peril, or momentary distraction in the workplace might justify 
excusing the conduct or characterizing it as non-negligent.  For example, 
as one court noted, “[a]n individual who is injured running into a busy 
street to say hello to his girl friend should not be under the same standard 
of care as one injured attempting to assist a toddler who has been struck 
by a car.”63  In the same vein, one who makes a poor decision despite 
adequate time to reflect on a course of action is more culpable than one 
who makes the same poor decision in an emergency.64  One who is 
working with dangerous machinery to accomplish his employer’s needs 
understandably may not be able to concentrate fully on his own safety.65 
Some courts completely hide this minimal fault exception behind a 
substantive rule.  For example, many courts once held that children under 
the age of seven were incapable of negligence.66  The rule was in all 
                                                     
 63. Bridges v. Bentley, 769 P.2d 635, 640 (Kan. 1989).  With respect to a mother rushing into a 
situation of danger to save her child: 
She was not there for a frivolous purpose but to save her child from imminent peril.  The 
law cannot say of her belief that a reasonable person would not have been able to share it.  
There was little time to deliberate, and there was less time for delay . . . . The mother had 
to choose at once, in agitation and with imperfect knowledge.  Errors of judgment, 
however, would not count against her if they resulted from the excitement and the 
confusion of the moment. 
Brock v. Peabody Coop. Equity Exch., 352 P.2d 37, 40–41 (Kan. 1960).  A rescue attempt will only 
rise to the level of contributory negligence when the rescuer’s conduct is rash.  Id. at 39. 
 64. “[W]here one is confronted through no fault of his own with a sudden emergency, his 
actions in extremis are not to be judged as they would be in ordinary circumstances.”  Fruit Indus., 
Inc. v. Petty, 268 F.2d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding plaintiff driver of car not contributorily 
negligent in head-on collision with truck that was trying to pass another truck and came over the 
crest of a hill in plaintiff’s lane); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296 cmt. b (1965); 
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 136 (2008) (describing one factor relevant to a 
party’s fault as “the particular circumstances, such as the existence of an emergency requiring a 
hasty decision”). 
 65. See Young v. Aro Corp., 111 Cal. Rptr. 535, 537 (Ct. App. 1973) (explaining that when a 
person’s job is especially dangerous, courts may “lessen the amount of caution required of him by 
law in the exercise of ordinary care”). 
 66. Most courts have sought to set a minimum age below which a child is presumed incapable 
of negligence, and about a dozen states set that age at seven.  See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS  
§ 32 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
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likelihood a mixture of the incapacity and the limited capacity of 
children to appreciate and avoid dangers.  After states adopted 
comparative fault, courts became more willing to submit to the jury 
issues of contributory negligence of children four, five, or six years old.67  
Obviously, children who run out into the street without looking have not 
suddenly become smarter or more attentive at a younger age.  The fault, 
if any, of these young children was probably presumed to be minor in 
comparison with the fault of those who were likely to injure them.  
During the contributory negligence era, young children were protected 
from the consequences of their possible contributory negligence by the 
“under seven” presumption.68  After comparative fault, the same children 
were not absolutely protected by the presumption but largely protected 
by the capacity of the trier of fact under a comparative fault system to 
attribute to them only a small percentage of the fault.69 
Clearly, the principle of imposing the entire burden of loss on the 
more culpable party became well established in the common law before 
the widespread adoption of comparative fault.  As will be seen, some 
courts and commentators will suggest that the same principle should 
apply to plaintiffs in modified comparative fault systems.70  Yet this 
principle does not justify the 49% or 50% cutoff point in the existing 
modified comparative fault systems.  All of the exceptions to the 
contributory negligence rule arose in the context of the all-or-nothing 
system in which the entire burden of a loss caused by two or more 
culpable parties was imposed on one of them.  In that context, it made 
                                                     
 67. See, e.g., Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 796 P.2d 549, 559 (Kan. 1990) (involving a six-
year-old); Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 250 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Minn. 1977) (involving a five-year-old); 
Lester v. Sayles, 850 S.W.2d 858, 867 (Mo. 1993) (involving a four-year-old); Tenebruso v. Toys 
“R” Us—NYTEX, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (App. Div. 1998) (involving a four-year-old); Brown 
v. Smalls, 481 S.E.2d 444, 449–51 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (involving a three-year-old); MacConnell v. 
Hill, 569 S.W.2d 524, 526–27 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (involving a six-year-old); Hanson v. Binder, 50 
N.W.2d 676, 678 (Wis. 1952) (involving a five-year-old). 
Children too young to appreciate and avoid danger are still held incapable of negligence.  See, 
e.g., Marson v. Anctil, 979 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (D. Vt. 1997) (involving a three-year-old); 
McFarland v. Indus. Helicopters, Inc., 502 So. 2d 593, 598 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (involving a two-
year-old); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743 (Minn. 1980) (involving a four-year-
old); Rider v. Speaker, 692 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (involving a fourteen-month-old); 
Strong v. Allen, 768 P.2d 369, 370 (Okla. 1989) (involving a two-year-old); Price v. Kitsap Transit, 
856 P.2d 384, 387 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a four-year-old). 
Despite its adoption of modified comparative fault, Illinois continues to adhere to the “tender 
years doctrine” that children under the age of seven are incapable of negligence.  Appelhans v. 
McFall, 757 N.E.2d 987, 991 (Ill. Ct. App. 2001) (involving a five-year-old child defendant). 
 68. See, e.g., Birmingham Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 41 So. 146, 146 (Ala. 1906); Ollis 
v. Houson, E. & W.T. Ry., 73 S.W. 30, 31 (Tex. Ct. App. 1903). 
 69. See 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 350 (2010). 
 70. See infra Part II.B. 
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infinite sense to put that burden on the more culpable party rather than on 
the less culpable party.  Once the option of sharing the loss between 
those parties became available, identifying the less culpable party no 
longer bore the same importance.  The burden could be shared on a 
proportionate fault basis.  The all-or-nothing system required one of two 
negligent parties to bear a disproportionate burden of loss.  Comparative 
fault does not.  The proposed 83.7% rule does not violate any principle 
carried over from the all-or-nothing system. 
B. Legislative or Judicial Rejection of Pure Comparative Fault 
Pure comparative fault allocates damages in proportion to each 
party’s fault without regard to the extent of the plaintiff’s fault.71  
Plaintiffs who are 60%, 70%, or 80% at fault may recover 40%, 30%, or 
20% of their damages respectively.  Pure comparative fault has been 
widely adopted internationally in civil law and common law countries, in 
maritime law, in federal legislation in the United States, and in twelve 
states plus Puerto Rico.72  However, the majority of American states have 
rejected pure comparative fault in favor of one of the three modified 
systems that limit comparative fault to a plaintiff whose fault is either 
less or at least not greater than the defendant’s fault.73 
Courts and commentators have offered three criticisms of pure 
comparative fault.  First, critics argue that it will lead to an increase in 
claims and thus contribute to a rise in insurance premiums, exacerbating 
the liability insurance crisis.74  It would seem axiomatic that if more 
plaintiffs are allowed to recover, insurance premiums would likely rise.  
While studies indicate that the adoption of comparative fault in lieu of 
contributory negligence has had only a negligible impact on claims 
filed75 and on insurance rates,76 some slight increase in insurance rates 
                                                     
 71. See supra notes 6–11. 
 72. See supra notes 6–11. 
 73. See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text. 
 74. For an excellent and concise coverage of the literature concerning the impact of 
comparative fault on claims filed and insurance rates, see Carol A. Mutter, Moving to Comparative 
Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 TENN. L. REV. 199, 237–45 
(1990).  See also Maloney, supra note 6, at 169–70 (discussing arguments for and against a 
comparative fault statute). 
 75. See Maurice Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A “Before and After” 
Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89, 90–93 (1959). 
 76. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 22.01[e].  A study of insurance rates in states previously 
using the contributory negligence rule indicated that the adoption of comparative fault had a minimal 
impact on insurance rates.  Cornelius J. Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability 
Insurance, 58 MICH. L. REV. 689, 726 (1960).  Some commentators concluded that before the formal 
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may occur in moving from a modified system to the pure system.77  The 
slight increase is a result of, but not necessarily a problem with, pure 
comparative fault.  As one court noted, “[t]o those who speculate that 
comparative negligence will cost more money or cause more litigation, 
we say there are no good economies in an unjust law.”78 
Second, critics argue that disagreement with the specific findings of 
fault percentages will lead to frequent appeals and thus increased 
litigation costs.  There is, however, no substantial evidence that pure 
comparative fault has increased litigation costs.79  The predicted flood of 
appeals has not materialized because courts treat jury determinations of 
fault percentages to be findings of fact subject to minimal judicial 
review.80 
The third criticism is that pure comparative fault offends the moral 
principles underlying the fault system.81  To ask a defendant to pay 
damages to a plaintiff who is more culpable than the defendant 
undermines the principle of personal responsibility.82  In the 
developmental years of negligence, claims tended to arise from simple 
accidents between neighbors at a time when accident insurance was 
unknown.83  The notion of personal responsibility reflected the 
individual’s need to look out for himself.84  Subsequently, during the 
industrial period of railroads and factories, “personal responsibility” 
                                                                                                                       
adoption of comparative fault, many juries applied a form of comparative fault by reducing a 
contributorily negligent plaintiff’s damages rather than barring him from all recovery.  Maloney, 
supra note 6, at 143–45; Peck, supra, at 726–28.  In essence, the adoption of comparative fault was 
more a change in name than in practice. 
 77. See Bruce L. Ottley, Comparing Comparative Negligence: Is There a Difference Between 
the “Pure” and “Modified” Forms?, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 243, 254–63 (1988).  Professor 
Ottley studied Illinois jury verdicts rendered in the two-year period before the shift from pure to the 
50% rule of modified comparative fault.  Id.  His data showed that 51% of the verdicts found 
plaintiff under 50% at fault and an additional 28% of the jury verdicts found plaintiff equally at fault.  
Id.  Only 21% of the verdicts found plaintiff more than 50% at fault, and thus, obviously, the larger 
number of claims would result in some impact on insurance rates.  Id.  It is not known how many of 
those claims found plaintiffs more than 50% but less than 83.7% at fault.  Id. 
 78. Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984) (emphasis omitted). 
 79. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 22.03[f], [g]. 
 80. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, § 21.2. 
 81. See Hayden, supra note 2, at 893–94; Mutter, supra note 74, at 249; Sobelsohn, supra note 
28, at 86; John H. Leskera, Comment, Change from “Pure” Comparative Negligence to “Modified” 
Comparative Negligence—Will It Alleviate the Insurance Crisis?, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 753, 769 
(1988); James D. Ghiardi, Comparative Negligence—The Case Against a Mississippi Type Statute, 
FOR THE DEFENSE, Oct. 1969, at 61, 64. 
 82. See Dan B. Dobbs, Accountability and Comparative Fault, 47 LA. L. REV. 939, 943–44 
(1987); Ghiardi, supra note 81, at 64. 
 83. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, § 1:4. 
 84. See id. § 1:4; Bohlen, supra note 1, at 253–54; Malone, supra note 2, at 125–26 
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became a euphemism to justify favoring industries important to 
economic growth.85  But those industries matured long ago and no longer 
need protection, and an increased share of negligence litigation involves 
automobile accidents between two or more individuals.86  The suggestion 
that “personal responsibility” justifies the imposition of a 
disproportionately large share of accident costs on one of two negligent 
drivers is simply not persuasive. 
Moreover, this criticism is really not based on the inappropriateness 
of allowing any recovery when the plaintiff is just slightly more at fault 
than the defendant.  One rarely finds expressions of moral outrage when 
the 45%-at-fault defendant is obligated to pay 55% of the plaintiff’s 
damages.87  A more culpable party sues for and recovers comparative 
contribution from a less culpable party without any suggestion of moral 
affront.88  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court sensed no moral 
affront whatsoever when it abandoned the traditional equal division rule 
in admiralty in favor of pure comparative fault in ship collision cases and 
allowed a 75%-at-fault ship to maintain an action for 25% of its damages 
against the United States.89  Rather, the criticism invariably centers on 
the highly culpable plaintiff suing a minimally culpable defendant for a 
tiny fraction of the plaintiff’s damages.  A common example is that of 
the proverbial 95%-at-fault plaintiff—the Freddy Krueger of tort law—
suing to recover 5% of his damages from a virtually innocent 
defendant.90  This result would arguably undermine the moral  
                                                     
 85. See WOODS & DEERE, supra note 3, § 1:5. 
 86. See John G. Fleming, The Supreme Court of California, 1974–1975—Foreword: 
Comparative Negligence at Last—By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 239, 242 (1976); Malone, 
supra note 2, at 140–41. 
 87. In theory, a jury might find it morally offensive to award damages to a plaintiff whose fault 
was equal to, not less than, a defendant’s fault.  Mutter, supra note 74, at 257 (suggesting that the 
49% rule coupled with a jury instruction on the legal effect of the percentage of fault findings would 
enable the jury to decide whether plaintiff deserved partial recovery of damages). 
 88. See Bielski v. Schulze 114 N.W.2d 105, 106 (Wis. 1962) (allowing a 95%-at-fault 
defendant to recover comparative contribution from a 5%-at-fault tortfeasor), overruled in part by 
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 2,  
§ 16.02 (arguing that the 50% rule “is simply inapplicable among tortfeasors”). 
 89. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975). 
 90. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 897 (Ill. 1981); Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641 So. 2d 20, 
24 (Miss. 1994); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v. Appalachian 
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W. Va. 1979); Nelson J. Becker, Indiana’s Comparative Fault 
Law: A Legislator’s View, 17 IND. L. REV. 881, 881 (1984); Hayden, supra note 2, at 891; 
Sobelsohn, supra note 28, at 81–82; Leskera, supra note 81, at 769; Legislative Notes, Act 35: An 
Act to Include Contracts Within the Arkansas Declaratory Judgments Act, 11 ARK. L. REV. 375, 392 
(1957). 
WESTERBEKE FINAL 7/6/2011  4:43 PM 
2011] PROPOSED 83.7% MODIFIED COMPARATIVE FAULT RULE 1009 
underpinnings of tort law generally and the principle of personal 
responsibility in particular. 
However, the 95%-at-fault plaintiff seems an all too convenient 
straw man who does not really provide justification for cutting off all 
plaintiff recovery once the plaintiff’s fault reaches 50% or 51% of the 
total.  Admittedly, a few such cases have been successfully litigated.91  
But these cases are rare92 and the moral affront posed by these cases may 
vary.  First, these cases are rare because they are simply not 
economically justified.  The overwhelming majority of personal injuries 
involve relatively modest sums and do not give rise to multi-million-
dollar claims.93  Trial lawyers take these cases on a contingency fee basis 
and recover nothing if the claim is unsuccessful.94  Assume, for example, 
a plaintiff is injured in an automobile collision and the trial lawyer takes 
the case on a 40% contingency fee basis.  After a two day trial, a jury 
finds the plaintiff 95% at fault, the defendant 5% at fault, and total 
damages at $25,000.95  The plaintiff will receive a judgment for $1250, 
of which he must pay $500 to the trial lawyer.  The $500 will not cover 
the trial lawyer’s overhead and time spent preparing and trying the 
case.96  A trial lawyer who regularly accepts such cases will soon find 
bankruptcy law to be his new area of concentration. 
In addition, a plaintiff assessed 90% or more of the fault does not 
necessarily equal a plaintiff whose conduct has been morally 
                                                     
 91. See, e.g., Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co. v. Jennings, 189 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(involving a plaintiff 97% at fault); Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 1258, 1261 
(5th Cir. 1988) (involving a plaintiff 90% at fault); Cruz v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 707 P.2d 360, 361 
(Colo. App. 1985) (involving a plaintiff 95% at fault); Blacconeri v. Aguayo, 478 N.E.2d 546, 549 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (involving a plaintiff 99% at fault); Murphy v. Muskegon Cnty., 413 N.W.2d 73, 
75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (involving plaintiffs 96% and 99% at fault respectively); Dinger v. Dep’t 
of Natural Res., 383 N.W.2d 606, 607 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (involving a plaintiff 95% at fault); 
Gaines v. K-Mart Corp., 860 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Miss. 2003) (involving a plaintiff 95% at fault); 
Sutton v. Piasecki Trucking, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 481, 482 (N.Y. 1983) (involving a plaintiff 99% at 
fault); Lamborn v. Phillips Pac. Chem. Co., 575 P.2d 215, 220–21 (Wash. 1978) (involving a 
plaintiff 99% at fault). 
 92. See Sanders et al., supra note 28, at 84. 
 93. See generally 6 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 21 (1967).  A study of 8086 verdicts showed that 61.3% 
were plaintiff verdicts and that the mean recovery was in the $3000 to $5000 range.  Id. § 21 fig. 3. 
 94. See generally Symposium, Contingency Fee Financing of Litigation in America, Third 
Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and Social Policy, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (1998) (discussing 
the development of the modern contingency fee system and the criticisms of such). 
 95. In a study of 8086 verdicts, plaintiffs were successful in 4955 cases, or 61.3%, and of the 
4955 successful cases, 594 cases produced verdicts of $25,000 or more.  6 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 21 fig. 
3 (1967). 
 96. See, e.g., Cruz, 707 P.2d at 361 (involving a FELA action in which the plaintiff was 95% at 
fault and recovered 5%, or $50, from a $1000 damage verdict—a 40% contingency fee would net the 
attorney $20). 
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reprehensible.  Fault is relative.  Consider, for example, two separate two 
car collisions.  In the first accident, both drivers may have been driving 
while highly intoxicated, and a jury may assess their fault to be equal.97  
The percentage of fault for each is not high because while each of them 
was highly culpable, their combined fault must add up to 100%.  In the 
second accident, the first driver was trying to make a U-turn on a 
highway on a foggy night when the second driver, driving slightly too 
fast for the foggy conditions, collided with the first driver.98  The first 
driver was assessed 90% of the total fault because, while his conduct was 
not highly culpable in an absolute sense, it was highly culpable in 
comparison with the fault of the second driver.  Each driver fell only 
slightly below the standard of reasonable care.  Each of them was only 
slightly at fault in an absolute sense, but the 90% fault assessed to the 
first driver reflects the requirement that their fault add up to 100%.99  An 
actor’s percentage of fault reflects how culpable he was only in 
comparison to the other actor, not how culpable he was in any absolute 
sense. 
Finally, courts and legislatures have less drastic methods of 
eliminating the claims of the highly culpable plaintiff.  Most pure 
comparative fault states have used the concept of “sole proximate cause” 
to dismiss the claim of the highly culpable plaintiff.100  The European 
Union is proposing a comparative fault statute that provides that a claim 
is inappropriate when the defendant’s share of the fault is insignificant, 
and no reduction of the defendant’s liability is appropriate when the 
plaintiff’s share of the fault is insignificant.101  These devices enable 
                                                     
 97. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that plaintiff’s 
blood alcohol level was 0.17 and defendant had consumed alcohol before driving a Peterbilt tractor 
above the posted speed limit); Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 592 (Utah 1982) (stating that 
plaintiff’s decedent, a pedestrian, had been smoking marijuana and was found 60% at fault and 
defendant driver had a blood alcohol count of 0.09% and was found 40% at fault). 
 98. See, e.g., Miller v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of the Army, 901 F.2d 894, 895 (10th Cir. 
1990). 
 99. See Shuey v. Hamilton, 540 P.2d 1122 (Colo. App. 1975); Avery v. Wadlington, 526 P.2d 
295 (Colo. App. 1974) (involving a children hit by cars in routine street accidents held to be 70% at 
fault); see also Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978) (involving a two-car collision in which 
one driver was found 90% at fault and the other 10% at fault). 
 100. Hayden, supra note 2, at 945. 
 101. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT 
COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) INTERIM OUTLINE EDITION (Christian von Bar et al. eds, 
2008). 
 (1) Where the fault of the person suffering the damage contributes to the occurrence or 
extent of legally relevant damage, reparation is to be reduced according to the degree of 
such fault. 
 (2) However, no regard is to be had to 
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courts to dismiss the highly culpable plaintiff without necessarily 
preventing claims by plaintiffs who are not deemed highly culpable but 
whose fault still exceeds 50% of the total fault.  Furthermore, in some of 
these cases the jury may drive the point home by assigning 100% of the 
fault to the plaintiff.102 
Finally, courts and commentators have not raised the same concerns 
about moral affront and judicial economy when a highly culpable 
defendant seeks to encumber a case and use judicial resources to assert a 
comparative fault defense against a minimally-at-fault plaintiff.  If it is 
morally irresponsible and a waste of judicial resources for a 90%-at-fault 
plaintiff to seek to recover 10% of his damages from a minimally-at-fault 
defendant, why is it not equally irresponsible and wasteful for a 90%-at-
fault defendant to seek a 10% reduction in damages owed to the plaintiff 
by asserting a comparative fault defense?103  Concerns about the 95%-at-
fault plaintiff should not be the tail that wags the dog.  They do not 
justify barring from recovery every plaintiff whose fault slightly exceeds 
50% of the total fault. 
In any event, the 83.7% rule of modified comparative fault is fully 
sufficient to resolve those concerns.  Any plaintiff more than 83.7% at 
fault is completely barred from recovery, and any defendant more than 
83.7% at fault is liable for all damages.  A party whose fault is 50% or 
greater, but does not exceed 83.7% of the total, would be added to the 
pool of parties afforded the benefits of comparative fault loss 
allocation.104 
                                                                                                                       
   (a) an insubstantial fault of the person suffering the damage 
   (b) fault or accountability whose contribution to the causation of the damage is 
insubstantial. 
Id.  This approach is similar to the 83.7% proposal in the sense that any highly culpable party—
plaintiff or defendant—bears the entire burden of the accident and the minimal or “insubstantial” 
fault of the other party is completely ignored. 
 102. See Biever v. Williams, 755 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Armstrong v. Indus. 
Elec. & Equip. Serv., 639 P.2d 81, 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981). 
 103. See, e.g., Wellborn v. Cobray Firearms, Inc., No. 98-8106, 1999 WL 999715, at *1 (10th 
Cir. Nov. 4, 1999) (finding defendant 90% at fault and reducing plaintiff’s damages by 10% under 
Wyoming’s comparative fault statute); Norman v. Farrow, 880 So. 2d 557, 561 (Fla. 2004) (finding 
defendant 90% at fault and reducing plaintiff’s economic and noneconomic damages by 10%); 
Fritscher v. Chateau Golf & Country Club, 453 So. 2d 964, 974 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (finding 
defendant 95% at fault and reducing plaintiff’s damages by 5%). 
 104. One commentator has suggested that economic analysis might favor modified comparative 
fault.  See William P. Kratzke, A Case for a Rule of Modified Comparative Negligence, 65 UMKC 
L. REV. 15, 21 (1996).  Economic analysis evaluates legal rules in terms of their cost efficiency.  Id. 
at 19.  This issue is beyond the scope of this Article for two reasons.  First, the major contributors to 
economic analysis have not fully agreed on whether traditional contributory negligence or 
comparative fault is actually more efficient and thus the preferable approach.  Compare John Prather 
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 340–46 (1973) (stating that 
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III. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF AN UNUSUAL CUTOFF NUMBER 
Dean Prosser, a strong advocate of pure comparative fault, sought to 
dismiss modified comparative fault as simply the result of political 
compromise.105  Yet one ought not to dismiss political compromise as an 
inherently undesirable process in the formulation of judicial rules.  
Political compromise may well reflect an attempt to accommodate two or 
more conflicting and legitimate principles or concerns.  While I prefer 
pure comparative fault, I recognize that courts and commentators may 
have a legitimate concern about highly culpable plaintiffs seeking 
damages from minimally culpable defendants.106  I strongly disagree, 
however, with the 49% or 50% cutoff point used in all modified 
comparative fault jurisdictions.  I am willing to compromise at some 
number between 49% and 100%.  I open the negotiation with 83.7%. 
Admittedly, legislatures have not been overly imaginative in 
selecting the cutoff point for modified comparative fault.  Indeed, only 
three states107 use a number—50%—as opposed to a generic comparison 
to define the cutoff point for modified comparative fault.  Thus, the 
statutes permit recovery if the plaintiff’s fault is “less than,”108 “not as 
                                                                                                                       
contributory negligence is efficient, but comparative fault is not), and George L. Priest, Modern Tort 
Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1987) (stating that the movement from 
contributory negligence to comparative fault has undermined deterrence), with Robert D. Cooter & 
Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1070 
(1986) (stating that comparative fault tends to minimize the excessive precautions caused by 
imperfect information), and Daniel Orr, The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote, 
20 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 120 (1991) (stating that comparative negligence strengthens incentives for 
precautions and reduces the likelihood of excess expenditures on them). 
Second, the development of economic analysis of tort loss allocation does not seem to have 
progressed enough to make a persuasive argument for any specific form of modified comparative 
fault.  Professor Kratzke hypothesizes cases in which the defendant has taken some precautions 
against injury but not enough to constitute reasonable care.  Kratzke, supra, at 18.  Modified 
comparative fault would then be appropriate when the additional precautions to prevent injury could 
be taken more cost effectively by the plaintiff.  Assuming Professor Kratzke is correct, his theory 
does not indicate whether there is a single cutoff point—40%, 50%, 60%, 75%, or 83.7%—that 
would produce the maximum efficiency or whether there would be one cutoff point that would be 
appropriate for all cases. 
Finally, it is also unclear whether economic analysis would be effective in producing an 
optimal rule that would apply to two-injury cases such as the two car automobile collision in which 
both drivers are injured and maintain claims against each other.  In short, Professor Kratzke has 
started a useful discussion, but more is needed before we can conclude how economic analysis might 
influence the choice of possible modified comparative fault systems. 
 105. Prosser, supra note 1, at 25. 
 106. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 107. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 33.001 (West 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(b) (West 2007). 
 108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(a) (2005 & Supp. 2010). 
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great as,”109 or “not greater than”110 the defendant’s fault, or bar recovery 
if plaintiff’s fault is “equal to or exceeds,”111 “equal to or greater than,”112 
“greater than,”113 or “as great as.”114 
The treatment of joint and several liability following the widespread 
adoption of comparative fault demonstrates considerable legislative 
imagination.  A few states retained joint and several liability for multiple 
negligent defendants.115  Other states completely abolished joint and 
several liability and replaced it with proportionate liability.116  However, 
a substantial minority of states have created various hybrid mixtures of 
the two approaches, each in an apparent attempt to balance different 
policy concerns. 
Some states draw distinctions based on the type of damage.  For 
example, California, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Ohio retain joint and several 
liability for economic damages, but impose proportionate liability for 
non-economic damages.117  Illinois retains joint and several liability for 
past and future medical expenses for any defendant whose fault is not 
                                                     
 109. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111(1) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (West  
2006). 
 110. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (West 
2006); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31(a) (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 
2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (2009); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 41.141(1) (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 2A:15-5.1 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.470(1) (West 2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7102(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 895.045(1) (West 2006). 
 111. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505(A) (2003). 
 112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.09 (2009). 
 113. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 (West 2011). 
 114. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-02 (West 2008). 
 115. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 
(West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b.1); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-20-4, 9-20-4.1 (West 2006). 
 116. The abolition of joint and several liability refers to actions in which independent negligent 
defendants combine to cause a single indivisible injury.  All states recognize some exceptions based 
on specific actions such as intentional torts, concerted action, or certain toxic torts.  Some statutes 
adopt proportionate liability.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.080 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-2506; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.5 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 52-572h(c) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 6-803 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-8; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) 
(2005 & Supp. 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.182 (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.  
§ 600.2956 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 
(West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-02; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.485 (West 2003); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-820 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (West 2007); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (West 2007). 
 117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (West 2008); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.10; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (West 2004). 
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less than the plaintiff’s fault, and imposes proportionate liability for all 
other damages.118  These statutes reflect the great importance placed on 
full compensation for economic losses, such as medical costs and lost 
income, and the lesser importance placed on recovery of soft damages, 
such as pain and suffering or mental distress.119 
Other states draw distinctions based on a defendant’s share of the 
total fault.  They employ a hybrid approach that blends joint and several 
liability and proportionate liability in a manner designed to prevent 
undue burdens on less culpable defendants.  Iowa, Missouri, Montana, 
New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin limit 
joint and several liability to defendants whose fault is 50% or more of the 
total120 or whose fault is more than 50% of the total.121  Other states use 
variations of the 50% figure.  South Dakota limits joint and several 
liability to twice a defendant’s share of the total fault if the defendant 
was found to be less than 50% at fault.122  Louisiana imposes several 
liability but reverts to joint and several liability if the plaintiff is unable 
to collect 50% of his damages.123 
Not all statutes have used 50% as the cutoff point between joint and 
several liability and proportionate liability.  An earlier version of the 
Minnesota statute generally held multiple defendants jointly and 
severally liable but limited the liability of any defendant who is 15% or 
less at fault to four times his proportionate fault share of the total 
damages.124  It also limited the liability of any governmental entity less 
than 35% at fault to twice its proportionate fault share of the damages.125  
West Virginia retains joint and several liability generally but limits the 
liability of any defendant 30% or less at fault to proportionate liability.126 
Other states have constructed elaborate frameworks to limit, but not 
abolish, joint and several liability.  New Jersey has a three-tiered 
                                                     
 118. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1117 (West 2003). 
 119. This distinction is consistent with the widespread adoption of caps on non-economic 
damages in tort litigation generally or in medical malpractice litigation specifically.  See, e.g., KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02. 
 120. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.4 (West 1998 & Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15(A) 
(Supp. 2010). 
 121. MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.067 (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703 (2009); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 507:7-e (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 15 (West 2008); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 33.013(b) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010). 
 122. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-8-15.1 (2004). 
 123. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2324(B) (2010); Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885, 892 (La. 
1993). 
 124. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (1986) (amended 1988). 
 125. Id. 
 126. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-24 (West 2010). 
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approach.  It retains joint and several liability fully for any defendant 
60% or more at fault, retains joint and several liability for economic 
damages and imposes proportionate liability for non-economic damages 
for any defendant more than 20% but less than 60% at fault, and imposes 
proportionate liability for any defendant 20% or less at fault.127  The 
former Florida statute had an even more elaborate system in which 
proportionate liability applied to any defendant 10% or less at fault and 
to any defendant less at fault than the plaintiff, and then it incrementally 
restored joint and several liability for certain types of damage and 
amounts of damage as a defendant’s fault increased from between 10% 
and 25%, to between 25% and 50%, and above 50%.128 
Joint and several liability had been a basic common law doctrine 
during the all-or-nothing period.  It was supported by a simple, straight-
forward syllogism—better that a disproportionate burden fall on one of 
the negligent defendants than on an innocent plaintiff.129  If the plaintiff 
were also negligent, he would be completely barred by the doctrine of 
contributory negligence.  With the adoption of comparative fault, the 
traditional rationale for joint and several liability no longer existed.  
While some courts suggested that comparative negligence eliminated 
joint and several liability,130 other courts relied on compensation and 
causation rationales to retain joint and several liability.131  Neither 
position is completely persuasive,132 and the varied compromises in the 
hybrid statutes may well reflect better solutions.  Similarly, an unusual 
number such as 83.7% could reflect better balance of plaintiff-defendant 
loss allocation policy considerations than 49%, 50%, or 100%.  
Certainly, the variations in the multiple defendant provisions suggest that 
a novel new cutoff point would not necessarily be inappropriate. 
                                                     
 127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (West 2000). 
 128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (1999) (amended 2006). 
 129. See generally FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed. 1986) 
(describing joint tortfeasors and joint and several liability). 
 130. See, e.g., Miles v. West, 580 P.2d 876, 880 (Kan. 1978) (describing proportionate liability 
as “the price plaintiffs must pay for being relieved of the burden formerly placed upon them by the 
complete bar to recovery based on contributory negligence”). 
 131. See, e.g., Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (Ill. 1983). 
 132. The adoption of comparative fault negates the traditional rationale in favor of joint and 
several liability; it does not provide any affirmative rationale for the abolition of joint and several 
liability.  Conversely, the argument that each negligent defendant has caused the entirety of an 
indivisible injury does not eliminate the fact that a negligent plaintiff has also caused the entirety of 
his indivisible injury. 
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IV. THE BENEFITS OF THE 83.7% SYSTEM 
Previously, I suggested that no persuasive policy of tort loss 
allocation supports cutting off comparative fault allocation and returning 
to the absolute bar of contributory negligence once the plaintiff’s share 
of the total fault reaches 50% or 51%.  Indeed, a number of advantages 
flow from the adoption of a significantly higher cutoff point.  First and 
foremost, a higher cutoff point would end an irrational discrimination 
between parties whose faults are indistinguishable.  Second, it would 
permit a more equitable allocation of loss in two-injury cases in which 
each of the two actors has a damage claim against the other.  Third, it 
would greatly diminish, and perhaps completely eliminate, the need for a 
special jury instruction on the legal effect of comparative fault findings.  
Fourth, a higher cutoff point eliminates the need to choose between the 
aggregation rule and the separate comparison rule. 
A. Equal Treatment of Fundamentally Similar Faults 
The primary benefit of the 83.7% rule is its elimination of unjustified 
discrimination between identical or essentially similar faults.  The 49% 
and 50% rules of modified comparative fault discriminate between 
identical or similar faults for no rational reason.133  This discrimination 
flows from a single percentage point in the fault determinations that are 
admittedly imprecise and unreliable.  Under the 49% rule, a finding of 
49% fault means plaintiff will recover 51% of his damages while a 
finding of 50% fault completely bars him from recovery.  Under the 50% 
rule, a finding of 50% fault means plaintiff will recover 50% of his 
damages while a finding of 51% fault completely bars him from 
recovery.  The result of these rules is an irrational and onerous 
discrimination occurring at the very point at which the fault of the two 
parties is deemed virtually identical.  A higher cutoff point could 
eliminate much of this discrimination. 
1. The Limitations of Fault Percentages 
For two basic reasons, one should use caution in relying on fault 
percentages to define the point at which loss allocation reverts from 
comparative fault back to the complete bar of contributory negligence.  
                                                     
 133. None of the principles of the former all-or-nothing system and none of the objections to 
pure comparative fault justify the 49% or 50% cutoff points.  See supra Part II.A. 
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First, the 49% and 50% rules presuppose a mathematical accuracy in 
determining fault percentages that, in fact, does not exist.  Courts and 
commentators are virtually unanimous that these percentages lack all 
pretense of mathematical precision.134  Determining a party’s percentage 
of fault is simply influenced by too many variables to permit consistency 
and predictability.135 
Second, an actor’s percentage of fault is not absolute or fixed, but 
rather relative in comparison with the fault of other actors involved in an 
injury-producing occurrence.136  Thus, a person driving a car under the 
influence of alcohol may be given a high percentage of fault if the other 
driver’s fault was minor.  That same intoxicated driver may be given a 
more moderate percentage of fault if the other driver committed a 
similarly serious departure from the standard of care.137  In essence, a 
jury determination that an actor was 50% at fault in an accident has little 
meaning by itself.  Given their unreliability, fault percentages are 
justified primarily by the lack of a better alternative to eliminate the 
cases most likely to constitute nuisance claims by highly culpable 
plaintiffs.138 
2. Higher Cutoff Point Options 
I will concede for sake of argument that fault percentages determined 
by the trier of fact in a comparative fault action are accurate in the 
limited sense that they will usually be upheld on appeal and thus are 
final.139  To address the problem of inappropriate discrimination between 
similar faults, I note that the plaintiff’s share of the total fault in the cases 
progresses along a continuum from less than the defendant’s fault to 
                                                     
 134. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alaska 1975); Ray J. Aiken, Proportioning 
Comparative Negligence—Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 
293, 294–96 (1970); Mutter, supra note 74, at 234; Prosser, supra note 1, at 9; G. Edward White, 
Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Perspective, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1265, 1285–86 
(1987). 
 135. See Aiken, supra note 134, at 295–96. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing that plaintiff-
driver with blood alcohol level of 0.17% considered 50% at fault when other driver was speeding 
with 0.10% blood alcohol); Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) (discussing that driver with 
blood alcohol level of 0.09% who pled guilty to negligent homicide found 40% at fault when 
decedent who walked out into the highway had been using marijuana). 
 138. See Mutter, supra note 74, at 231 (“The hallmark of comparative negligence is fidelity to 
the fault concept and thereby fairness to the litigants.”); see also Aiken, supra note 134, at 295. 
 139. Courts view the percentages of fault found by the trier of fact as factual findings that are 
only rarely disturbed on appeal.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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equal with the defendant’s fault to an even larger share of the total fault.  
If a legislature should select a higher cutoff point at which comparative 
fault loss allocation ends and the complete bar of contributory negligence 
is restored, the question becomes how much of the total fault may be 
attributed to the plaintiff while still permitting a comparative fault loss 
allocation. 
The most serious problem with the existing systems of modified 
comparative fault involves the discrimination between parties whose 
fault was essentially identical.  The imprecision of fault findings 
exacerbates this problem.  One cannot demonstrate unequivocally that 
the faults were, in fact, identical.  Indeed, different juries would probably 
arrive at different assessments of the parties’ fault.  Assume a two-car 
collision in which driver A is injured and both driver A and driver B are 
negligent by reason of essentially identical conduct.  Three different 
juries viewing the same evidence would almost certainly arrive at 
different allocations of the fault between driver A and driver B.140  One 
might divide the fault 40% to driver A and 60% to driver B, while the 
second might divide it equally, and the third might divide it 60% to A 
and 40% to B.  Under the 49% rule, driver A would recover 60% of his 
damages from the first jury but nothing from the other two.  Under the 
50% rule, driver A would recover 60% of his damages from the first jury, 
50% of his damages from the second, and nothing from the third.  In the 
absence of any identifiable difference in the culpability involved in their 
conduct or in the moral disappointment attendant to their conduct, these 
different outcomes are unjustified and morally repugnant.141 
One solution to this discrimination might be a 60% rule similar to the 
former Texas rule in product liability cases.142  A 60% rule would allow 
any party whose fault is not greater than 60% to recover a partial 
recovery.  It would avoid the most egregious results of the existing 
systems of modified comparative fault.  In most cases, parties whose 
                                                     
 140. See, e.g., Dixon, 658 P.2d at 596 (explaining that the jury initially divided the fault 40% to 
plaintiff and 60% to defendant, but then reconsidered, and allocated the fault 60% to plaintiff and 
40% to defendant). 
 141. One eminent scholar addressed the issue succinctly: 
To distinguish in an all-or-nothing way between the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, 
who is deemed forty-five percent negligent and the party who is deemed fifty-five 
percent negligent is substantially unfair—especially when the relevant judgments are 
imprecisely and unpredictably rendered after the event by an ad hoc lay jury.  The risk of 
treating basically equal litigants in a dramatically unequal manner is simply too great. 
Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 
727 (1978) (footnote omitted). 
 142. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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fault might seem indistinguishable would be treated equally to partial 
recovery rather than barring some of them completely from any recovery 
in a virtually random manner.  Most importantly, a 60% rule would 
shatter the myth that even under comparative fault it would be morally 
repugnant to let a more culpable party recover partially from a less 
culpable party.143 
While a 60% rule would constitute an important improvement in loss 
allocation for parties whose fault seems indistinguishable, the question 
remains whether a more generous rule would be desirable.  For example, 
a 75% rule has a certain facial appeal, with comparative fault applicable 
to parties whose fault does not exceed three-quarters of the total fault.144  
It was a number used by Dean Prosser in his oft-cited 1953 article on 
comparative fault: 
Obviously any estimate that 40 per cent of the total fault rests with the 
pedestrian who walks out into the street in the path of an automobile, 
and 60 per cent with the driver who is not looking and runs him down, 
represents nothing resembling accuracy based on demonstrable fact.  
The estimate might quite as well be anywhere between 25–75 and 75–
25.  Yet it is equally clear that a division of the plaintiff’s damages on 
any such basis is at least more accurate than one based on the arbitrary 
conclusion that 100 per cent of the responsibility rests with the plaintiff 
and none whatever with the defendant, or . . . 100 per cent with the 
defendant and none with the plaintiff—both of which are demonstrably 
wrong.145 
In addition, the division of fault was 25–75 in Reliable Transfer, the 
case in which the United States Supreme Court finally abandoned the 
equal division rule in favor of pure comparative fault for ship collision 
cases arising in admiralty.146  A 75% rule would extend comparative fault 
loss allocation to cases in which the disparity between the parties’ 
culpable conduct is somewhat more pronounced but in which most cases 
involve only ordinary negligence.147 
Nevertheless, I would suggest that the cutoff point be raised higher 
to some point such as 83.7%, which would encompass cases that 
                                                     
 143. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Dunigan & Phillips, supra note 2, at 794 (stating that apportionments of fault in 
common fractions are “a comfortable way for the jury to divide fault without the difficulty of 
calculating the precise fault of each party”). 
 145. Prosser, supra note 1, at 9. 
 146. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 399, 411 (1975). 
 147. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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primarily involve conduct within the broad realm of negligence.148  Three 
points should be noted.  First, the discriminatory effect of a single 
percentage point dictating the difference between partial recovery and 
total denial of recovery remains wherever the cutoff point is located.  
Hypothetically, juries could assess 83% fault and 84% fault respectively 
to two plaintiffs who each suffered $1000 in damages and whose fault is 
seemingly identical.  The 83%-at-fault plaintiff would recover $170, 
while the 84%-at-fault plaintiff would be denied recovery of $160.  
These results are simply the inevitable and unfortunate consequences of 
drawing lines based on mathematically imprecise numbers.  Yet the 
discrimination does not seem particularly inappropriate because the fault 
of the party who is 84% at fault is so disproportionate to the party 
assessed with the remaining 16%. 
Second, the higher the cutoff point, the less repugnant the 
discrimination.  The difference between receiving 51% of one’s damages 
and nothing under the 49% rule is far harsher than the difference between 
receiving 17% of one’s damages and nothing under the 83.7% rule.  In 
the first example, the plaintiff risks considerably more, even though the 
plaintiff and the defendant seem equally at fault.  In the second example, 
the plaintiff risks much less and his fault is nearly five times greater than 
the defendant’s fault.  A complete bar to recovery in the second example 
is simply not particularly repugnant. 
Third, the higher the cutoff point, the greater the concern about 
nuisance litigation, excessive transaction costs, and judicial economy.  
Even if pure comparative fault is the most logical approach to loss 
allocation between two culpable parties, these other factors increasingly 
enter the equation when the cutoff point becomes very high.  The 83.7% 
rule will exclude from partial recovery some parties whose fault was 
merely negligent and not at all aggravated or highly culpable.  For 
example, a child who starts to cross a street without looking for 
oncoming traffic is in the eyes of most observers negligent but not 
willful, wanton, or reckless, and yet she might be found 95% at fault 
simply because the driver of the car who hit her was barely negligent at 
all.149  Even though her conduct was merely ordinary negligence, denial 
of her action to recover 5% of her damages is not necessarily inconsistent 
                                                     
 148. As previously indicated, I have arbitrarily selected the number 83.7 to symbolize the point 
at which ordinary negligence would characterize most of the cases included in comparative fault 
treatment, and aggravated fault or nuisance value would characterize most of the cases excluded 
from any recovery. 
 149. See Rangel v. Graybar Elec. Co., 139 Cal. Rptr. 191, 192–93 (Ct. App. 1977) (finding that 
substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination of comparative negligence). 
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with other values and policies of tort law.  But 83.7% is my suggested 
cutoff point because it represents the point at which an increasing share 
of the cases will involve aggravated fault, a risk of nuisance claims, and 
a risk of wasted judicial resources.150 
3. A Short Quiz 
Because this Article had its origin in a classroom exercise, a pop quiz 
may be appropriate to demonstrate the imprecise nature of comparative 
fault determinations.  Consider the following six accident summaries 
taken from actual cases and try to guess the share of fault the jury 
assigned to each party:151 
 No. 1.  Defendant is driving north on a two lane highway and turns 
left to enter a school parking lot.152  Plaintiff, driving south at an 
excessive speed, comes over a slight rise in the road, sees defendant’s 
van turning across the highway in front of him, but cannot stop in time to 
avoid hitting defendant’s van.153 
 No. 2.  Defendant was operating a military truck pulling a twenty-
four foot trailer on a night when visibility was reduced by thick fog.154  
Defendant tried to make a U-turn on a two lane highway when plaintiff, a 
teenage driver traveling slightly too fast for the fog conditions, crashed 
into defendant’s truck.155 
 No. 3.  Plaintiff’s boat was going across a lake at an excessive 
speed.156  It was a moonless night and visibility was limited.157  Suddenly 
plaintiff’s passenger saw a transmission tower in front of him in the 
middle of the lake, and plaintiff was unable to avoid a collision.158  The 
transmission tower was unlit, although plaintiff was familiar with the 
lake from prior fishing trips and knew about the existence of the 
transmission tower.159 
                                                     
 150. Nobody could demonstrate that 83.7% is the exact point at which the cases become 
primarily nuisance cases or aggravated fault cases, but a legislature could pick 83.7% simply 
because it would represent a reasonable legislative judgment concerning the appropriate cutoff point. 
 151. For the answers to this pop quiz see infra note 174. 
 152. Stokes v. Lundeen, 7 P.3d 586, 588 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Miller v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Army, 901 F.2d 894, 895 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 155. Id. at 895–96. 
 156. See Woodford v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 798 F. Supp. 307, 310 (E.D.N.C. 1992) 
(stating the boat reached a cruising speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 312. 
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 No. 4.  Defendant was backing a van out of a parking lot across a 
sidewalk to the street at less than five miles per hour, but the cargo in the 
rear of the van partially blocked his view.160  He hit plaintiff, an eighty-
three-year-old pedestrian, who was walking along the sidewalk.161  
Plaintiff did not look carefully to see if any vehicles were coming out of 
the parking lot.162 
 No. 5.  Defendant driver was driving along a city street behind a 
vehicle that turned.163  At that moment, a twelve-year-old boy on his way 
home from school started to cross the street in the middle of the block 
rather than at the cross walk at the end of the block.164  Defendant did not 
see him in time to avoid hitting him with his car.165 
 No. 6.  Plaintiff’s decedent had been smoking marijuana when he 
started to cross a street at night.166  Defendant was driving down the 
street slightly over the speed limit and with a 0.09% blood alcohol 
content.167  She saw decedent crossing the street, but when he faltered, 
she was unable to avoid hitting and killing him.168  In a separate criminal 
action, defendant pled guilty to negligent homicide.169 
If you scored within five percentage points or less on five or six of 
the cases, you continue to advocate vigorously for the existing modified 
comparative fault systems.  If you scored within five percentage points or 
less on two, three, or four of the cases, you may opt for either a 60% rule 
or a 75% rule.  If you scored within five percentage points or less on only 
one or none of the cases, join me in advocating for the 83.7% rule. 
I submit that nothing in these cases justifies barring partial recovery.  
Each of these accidents is a part of the ongoing carnage on the 
highway,170 and no party is being asked to pay for any amount of damage 
that he has not in fact caused.  With automobile accidents comprising a 
substantial share of the tort system, a compelling reason should exist for 
                                                     
 160. Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 684 (Idaho 1978). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. (stating plaintiff had to walk past the van to cross the entrance where he was struck 
but that plaintiff did not notice the van until it struck him). 
 163. Shuey v. Hamilton, 540 P.2d 1122, 1124 (Colo. App. 1975). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 592 (Utah 1982). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 593. 
 170. For statistics and data on highway fatalities, see FARS Encyclopedia: National Statistics, 
NAT’L HIGHWAY SAFETY ADMIN., http://www-fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 
8, 2011). 
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a system that prevents an equitable allocation of loss among the parties.  
The 83.7% system would maximize equitable loss allocation in all but 
those cases that involve conduct undeserving of equitable treatment or 
such a high share of the total fault as to make them a drain on judicial 
resources. 
B. Equitable Treatment of Two-Injury Accidents 
The second major benefit of the 83.7% rule is that it enables a 
relatively equitable allocation of losses in two-injury accidents.  The 
policy of personal responsibility arose out of necessity at an early point 
in common law development and then continued as part of a broader 
legal policy of protecting industrial growth.171  In the modern era, the 
focus of tort litigation has shifted considerably to automobile accident 
litigation,172 with a concomitant de-emphasis on personal 
responsibility.173  Moreover, automobile accidents have one feature not 
often found in the earlier eras—two drivers in an automobile accident, 
each suffering injury and each initiating a claim against each other.174 
Under the existing systems of modified comparative fault, an 
equitable allocation of loss is virtually impossible whenever both parties 
to an accident are injured and seek to maintain claims for recovery of 
damages against each other.175  The only situation in which both drivers 
may recover arises under the 50% rule when the trier of fact allocates 
                                                     
 171. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Maloney, supra note 6, at 157–58 (explaining how the flood of automobile cases in 
which plaintiffs are denied recovery because of the contributory negligence rule is evidence that 
comparative negligence statutes should cover automobile accidents); Schwartz, supra note 141, at 
723 (referring to accidents involving motor vehicles as a “major class of accidents”). 
 173. The de-emphasis is not that plaintiffs should be any less vigilant for their own safety.  They 
still have the most to lose in an accident.  But with the advent of substantial automobile litigation, 
both drivers should have the same or very similar obligations of personal responsibility.  Both have a 
great deal to lose in an accident.  In the industrial era, the individual plaintiff had a great deal to 
lose—life or limb—while the corporate defendant usually only risked the loss of money, often 
insurance money. 
 174. The answers to the pop quiz in Part IV.A.3.: For question 1, plaintiff 51% and defendant 
49% at fault. Stokes v. Lundeen, 7 P.3d 586, 590 (Or. Ct. App. 2000).  For question 2, plaintiff 10% 
and defendant 90% at fault.  Miller v. United States ex rel. Dep’t of Army, 901 F.2d 894, 895 (10th 
Cir. 1990).  For question 3, plaintiff 95% and defendant 5% at fault.  Woodford v. Carolina Power & 
Light Co., 798 F. Supp. 307, 313 (E.D.N.C. 1992).  For question 4, plaintiff 50% and defendant 50% 
at fault.  Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 684 (Idaho 1978).  For question 5, plaintiff 70% and 
defendant 30% at fault.  Shuey v. Hamilton, 540 P.2d 1122, 1124 (Colo. App. 1975).  For question 
6, plaintiff 60% and defendant 40% at fault.  Dixon, 658 P.2d at 592. 
 175. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 121 (2008); Dunigan & 
Phillips, supra note 2, at 795. 
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50% of the fault to each of them.  In that situation, the fault of neither 
driver is greater than the fault of the other.176  Ironically, the same 
allocation of fault under the 49% rule results in completely denying any 
recovery to either of them because neither of them is less at fault than the 
other.177 
Under any other allocation of the fault between the two drivers, one 
driver is by definition less at fault than the other and thus able to recover 
a proportionate fault share of his damages.  The other driver is by 
definition more at fault and bears a disproportionate share of the total 
damages—namely, all of his own loss and a portion of the other driver’s 
loss.  For example, assume a two-car collision in which driver A is 40% 
at fault and driver B is 60% at fault, and each of them suffered $100,000 
in damages.  Under either rule of modified comparative fault, driver A 
recovers 60%, or $60,000, from driver B, while driver B is completely 
barred from any recovery against driver A.  Thus, of the total $200,000 
damages in the accident, driver A caused $80,000—$40,000 to driver B 
and $40,000 to himself—and driver B caused $120,000—$60,000 to 
driver A and $60,000 to himself.  Yet driver A bears a $40,000 burden—
the 40% of his own injuries which are uncollectible, while driver B bears 
a $160,000 burden—the $60,000 paid to driver A and 100% of his own 
injuries ($100,000) which are uncollectible.178 
At least two devices exist to temper the harshness of modified 
comparative fault in two-injury cases.  First, a majority of modified 
comparative fault states permit an instruction to the jury explaining the 
legal effect of the jury’s findings on fault percentages.179  Under the 50% 
rule, a jury would then appreciate that recovery of partial damages by 
both drivers is possible only with a 50% allocation of fault to each driver.  
The fairness of this adjustment by the jury depends in part on what 
allocation of fault the jury might have rendered in the absence of such an 
instruction.  Moving their findings from 45% for one and 55% for the 
other to 50% for each seems to be well within the margin for error and 
not entirely inappropriate.  Moving their findings from 20% for one and 
80% for the other to 50% for each seems unfair to the driver initially 
deemed only 20% at fault. 
                                                     
 176. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT prefatory note, 12 U.L.A. 121 (2008); Dunigan & 
Phillips, supra note 2, at 795. 
 177. See Dunigan & Phillips, supra note 2, at 795. 
 178. See, e.g., Miles v. West, 580 P.2d 876, 879 (Kan. 1978) (explaining that both drivers injured 
and fault allocated 40% to one and 60% to the other). 
 179. See infra Part IV.C. 
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Under the 49% rule, the instruction on the legal effect of the fault 
findings can help the plaintiff in a one-injury case in which the jury, 
aided by the instruction, finds the plaintiff only 49% at fault as opposed 
to 50% or some higher percentage.180  However, the instruction can only 
help one of the two drivers in a two-injury case by allocating the fault 
49% to one and 51% to the other rather than 50% to each, thus enabling 
at least one of them recover. 
Second, under the 49% rule the joinder of a third tortfeasor in the 
action may enable both drivers to recover a share of their damages.181  If 
the jury allocates 10% of the fault to the third tortfeasor and 45% of the 
fault to each of the two drivers, both drivers can recover 55% of their 
damages, 45% from the other driver and 10% from the third tortfeasor.  
If the third tortfeasor is an immune party,182 each driver might still 
recover 45% of his damages from the other driver.  Of course, if the third 
tortfeasor is only marginally at fault, he could raise concerns about moral 
affront, nuisance litigation, and the wasteful use of judicial resources. 
Under the 83.7% rule, these problems are almost entirely resolved.  
In the 40%-at-fault driver A and 60%-at-fault driver B example, each 
driver would recover a proportionate fault of his own damages and be 
responsible for a proportionate fault share of the other’s damages.  Even 
if instructed about the legal effects of their fault findings, juries will have 
no reason to distort their findings to achieve what they believe to be a 
just result.  One party or the other will still join additional tortfeasors 
because a percentage of fault assigned to an additional tortfeasor will 
usually benefit one or both of the original parties,183 but they will not join 
an additional tortfeasor simply to avoid the negative effects of modified 
comparative fault.  Limited distortion of equitable loss allocation will 
only occur if one driver’s fault exceeds 83.7%.  The higher the cutoff 
point, the more frequently equitable loss allocation will occur in two-
injury cases. 
Proponents of modified comparative fault use the two-injury 
example to demonstrate what they assert is a flaw in pure comparative 
                                                     
 180. See Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of Salem Twp., 582 P.2d 271, 273 (Kan. 1978) (the plaintiff was 
found 49% at fault after the jury was given a legal effect instruction). 
 181. A number of states have provisions in their comparative fault statutes permitting the joinder 
of additional tortfeasors.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(c) (2005 & Supp. 2010); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(4) (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75B-5-818 (West 2009). 
 182. Some states permit the “joinder” of immune, unknown, or unavailable parties for purposes 
of allocating fault among all parties contributing to the injury.  See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 
867, 875–76 (Kan. 1978); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tackett, 841 So. 2d 1107, 1113–14 (Miss. 2003). 
 183. An additional tortfeasor’s fault will reduce the shares of fault that would otherwise have 
been assigned to the other parties because the shares of all parties must still add up to 100%. 
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fault.  They hypothesize a case in which driver A is 75% at fault and 
suffers $100,000 in damages while driver B is 25% at fault and suffers 
$10,000 in damages.184  Under either pure comparative fault or the 
proposed 83.7% rule of modified comparative fault, driver A would 
recover $25,000 from driver B, and driver B would recover $7500 from 
driver A.  They conclude that pure comparative fault violates principles 
of justice because the more culpable driver will recover a substantially 
larger amount of damages from the less culpable driver.185 
The argument seems out of focus.  Reduced to its essentials, it is 
simply an argument that recovery by a plaintiff more at fault than the 
defendant violates a moral sense of justice.186  If driver B were the only 
party injured in the accident, he would recover still only $7500 because 
that is 75% of the total damages he suffered.  If driver A were the only 
party injured in the accident, he would still recover $25,000 because that 
is 25% of the total damages he suffered.  Each party pays for the damage 
he has caused and no more. 
C. Possible Elimination of a Legal Effect Instruction 
A majority of modified comparative fault states mandate or permit 
the use of special verdicts in comparative fault cases.187  The special 
verdict essentially requires the jury to determine only the percentage of 
fault of each party and the total damages suffered by a claimant.188  In the 
period prior to the mid-1970s, the virtually unanimous rule was that trial 
courts would not instruct the jury on the legal effect of their factual 
determinations.189  In theory, this “blindfold” approach let juries make 
unbiased determinations without favoring one side or the other.190  
Moreover, it preserved the traditional role of the jury as fact finder and 
the court as decider of legal issues.191  The difficulty with this approach 
                                                     
 184. See Sobelsohn, supra note 28, at 88–89; Leskera, supra note 81, at 769. 
 185. See Sobelsohn, supra note 28, at 88–89; Leskera, supra note 81, at 769. 
 186. See supra Part II.B. 
 187. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 17.04. 
 188. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(b) (2005 & Supp. 2010). 
 189. See Schaffer, supra note 25, at 832.  See also generally Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 
33 TEX. L. REV. 273 (1955) (discussing arguments for and against the use of special verdicts in 
Texas courts); Charles Alan Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 F.R.D. 199 
(1966) (discussing arguments for and against the use of special verdicts in the federal courts). 
 190. See, e.g., Cassia Creek Reservoir Co. v. Harper, 426 P.2d 209, 211–12 (Idaho 1967); 
McGowan v. Story, 234 N.W.2d 325, 328–30 (Wis. 1975). 
 191. See Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., 960 F. Supp. 844, 861 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1154 
(3d Cir. 1998); Wheeler v. Bagley, 575 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Neb. 1998); McGowan, 234 N.W.2d at 
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was the tendency to produce harsh and unintended results.  A jury might 
allocate the fault evenly between plaintiff and defendant, believing that 
the plaintiff would receive half his damages, only to discover that under 
the 49% rule the plaintiff was completely barred from recovery.192 
The response was to authorize or mandate a special instruction to 
inform the jury of the legal effects of its comparative fault fact 
findings.193  Courts offered three related reasons for rejecting the rule 
against such an instruction.  First, the rule would be futile because 
intelligent jurors and jurors who have participated in prior trials will 
often have some knowledge of the legal effects of their comparative fault 
findings.194  Second, the rule would cause juries to speculate 
unnecessarily on the meaning of their comparative fault findings, often 
leading to mistaken and unintended results.195  Third, the rule is an 
unwarranted intrusion on the traditional role of the jury to temper harsh 
rules of law and produce substantial justice for the parties.196 
Today a majority of modified comparative fault states authorize or 
mandate an instruction on the legal effect of the jury’s comparative fault 
findings.197  In some states the instruction is mandated either by statute198 
or by judicial decision,199 and it is reversible error not to give the 
instruction even if a party did not request it.200  Other states require a 
                                                                                                                       
329.  But see Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 1992) (noting that “[c]ommentators who 
view the jurors as ignorant and emotional anachronisms in modern courts are naturally in favor of 
strict a separation between the fact-finding function of the jury and the application of law by the 
court”). 
 192. See, e.g., Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 690 (Idaho 1978); Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 
881, 883 (W. Va. 1982). 
 193. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 17.05. 
 194. See, e.g., Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 396 (Haw. 1986); Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of Salem 
Twp., 582 P.2d 271, 280 (Kan. 1978); Sollin v. Wangler, 627 N.W.2d 159, 163–64 (N.D. 2001). 
 195. See, e.g., Seppi, 579 P.2d at 690; Dilaveris v. W.T. Rich. Co., 673 N.E.2d 562, 566 (Mass. 
1996); DeCelles v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways, 795 P.2d 419, 421 (Mont. 1990); Sollin, 627 
N.W.2d at 164–65. 
 196. See, e.g., Porche v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 390 F. Supp. 624, 632 (E.D. La. 1975); 
Thomas, 582 P.2d at 280.  But see Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 853 A.2d 940, 951 (N.J. 2004). 
 197. Some empirical research suggests that plaintiffs recover more often but recover smaller 
verdicts when the jury is not blindfolded.  Jordan H. Leibman et al., Blindfolding Comparative Fault 
Juries on Percentage of Negligence: Should Indiana Follow Lead of Illinois?, 41 RES GESTAE, May 
1988, at 24, 29–30. 
 198. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(5) 
(West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.09 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.605(2) (West 
Supp. 2009). 
 199. See, e.g., Cook v. Doty, 608 P.2d 1028, 1029–30 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); McIntyre v. 
Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992). 
 200. See Nail v. Doctor’s Bldg., Inc., 708 P.2d 186, 189 (Kan. 1985); see also Wheeler v. 
Bagley, 575 N.W.2d 616, 620–21 (Neb. 1998) (explaining that failure to instruct jury on reduction of 
damages by percentage of plaintiff’s fault is reversible error). 
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party to request the instruction but treat as reversible error failure to give 
the instruction when requested.201  Finally, a number of states permit the 
instruction but treat the issue as within the trial court’s discretion and 
recognize that the instruction might not be appropriate in some cases.202  
In a few states, attorneys may discuss with the jury in closing argument 
the meaning and application of the special instruction.203 
The special instruction is most compelling in states having the 49% 
rule or the separate comparison rule.  Both of these rules are likely to 
produce harsh results that the jury did not contemplate nor intend.204  The 
same might be said of states having the 50% rule in which the jury would 
expect a plaintiff found to be 55% at fault to recover 45% of his 
damages.  The concern about harsh or unintended results diminishes as 
the comparative fault system tolerates a higher percentage of plaintiff 
fault.  Under the proposed 83.7% rule of modified comparative fault, the 
need for a special instruction is really de minimis.  A real sense of 
unfairness arises in cases in which the jury, unaware of the legal effect of 
the state’s 49% rule, found the plaintiff and the defendant each 50% at 
fault.  Comparative fault findings are rough approximations, and no piece 
of “factual” evidence exists that would lead a jury to find the plaintiff 
only 49% at fault.  The 49% rule is truly a “booby trap for the 
unwary.”205  By contrast, little sense of unfairness would arise if a jury— 
                                                     
 201. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(b) (West 2007); Martel v. Mont. Power Co., 752 
P.2d 140, 145–46 (Mont. 1988). 
 202. See, e.g., Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683, 692 (Idaho 1978); Flood v. Southland Corp., 601 
N.E.2d 23, 30–31 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 616 N.E.2d 1068 (Mass. 1992); Sollin v. Wangler, 
627 N.W.2d 159, 165 (N.D. 2001); Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 596–97 (Utah 1982). 
 203. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(5) (West 1998); MINN. R. CIV. P. 49.01(b).  Despite having 
discretion, the trial court may commit reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on legal effect 
when jury questions during deliberations indicate jury confusion.  See, e.g., Rapoza v. Parnell, 924 
P.2d 572, 579 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996). 
 204. It is not the purpose of this Article to resolve the propriety of the legal effects instruction.  
On one side, the instruction could be viewed as encouraging low-level jury nullification by 
informing the jury how to thwart the will of the legislature.  In addition, the instruction opens the 
door for a never-ending list of other legal effect instructions.  See, e.g., Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 
396 (Haw. 1986) (informing jury about joint and several liability); Le’Gall v. Lewis Cnty., 923 P.2d 
427, 430 (Idaho 1996) (informing jury that an individual on the special verdict form is not a party to 
the action).  On the other hand, the instruction may be viewed as cautioning the jury against a hasty 
and convenient 50%–50% allocation without careful examination of all the evidence.  See, e.g., 
Seppi, 579 P.2d at 690.  I prefer to view it as that rare case in which two wrongs—the 49% rule and 
the legal effect instruction—make a right. 
 205. This phrase was used to describe the harsh and unexpected effect of the commercial law 
requirement of notice in product liability personal injury claims.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 
Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963).  The description is equally applicable to the 49% rule of 
modified comparative fault. 
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not instructed on the legal effects of the 83.7% rule—found a plaintiff 
85% at fault and then discovered that the plaintiff would recover nothing. 
D. Elimination of the Aggregation Versus Separate Comparison Issue 
In cases involving a single plaintiff and a single defendant, the 
application of modified comparative fault is straightforward.  If the 
plaintiff’s fault does not exceed the 49% or 50% cutoff point, the 
plaintiff recovers damages reduced in proportion to his fault.  If the 
plaintiff is 40% at fault and suffered $100,000 in total damages, he 
recovers $60,000.  Change the case, however, by adding a second 
defendant, making each defendant now 30% at fault.  If the single 
comparison rule is adopted and the plaintiff’s 40% fault is compared 
against each defendant separately, the plaintiff is completely barred from 
recovery because his 40% fault is greater than, not equal to or less than, 
each defendant’s 30% fault.  If the aggregation rule is adopted and the 
plaintiff’s 40% fault is compared against the 60% aggregate fault of the 
defendants, the plaintiff recovers $60,000.  The substantial majority of 
modified comparative fault states have adopted the aggregation rule.206  
Only three states follow the single comparison rule.207 
The choice between these two rules afforded courts one of their 
better opportunities to develop and explain a rationale for the 49% or 
50% cutoff point in modified comparative fault.  Unfortunately, in most 
states, the statutory language enabled the issue to be decided purely on 
the rules of statutory construction and interpretation.  The aggregation 
rule was clearly intended by legislatures that provided for a comparison 
of the plaintiff’s fault with the “combined negligence”208 or the 
“aggregate negligence”209 of parties against whom recovery is sought or 
                                                     
 206. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 3.05[c][1]. 
 207. Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin follow the single comparison rule, and each of them has a 
comparative fault statute that calls for comparison of the plaintiff’s fault with the fault of “the 
person” against whom recovery is sought.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 604.01 (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 2006). 
 208. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(b) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,  
§ 8132 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3(1)(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2010) (“combined 
percentage of fault”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 
2000); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-03.2-02 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.35 (West 
2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.600 (West Supp. 
2009). 
 209. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-31(a) (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2959 
(West 2010); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 2000) (“total amount of 
negligence” of the persons against whom recovery is sought); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185.09 
(2009) (“total negligence of all persons”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (West 2007) (“total 
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with the negligence or fault of the “party or parties”210 or of the 
“defendant or defendants” against whom recovery is sought.211  Thus, in 
the great majority of states fairly straightforward statutory construction 
avoided any meaningful analysis of the 49% or 50% cutoff point in 
modified comparative fault. 
Four states had modified comparative fault statutes that provided for 
a comparison of the plaintiff’s fault with the fault of “the person” against 
whom recovery is sought.212  The Idaho Supreme Court relied on this 
language and “fairness” considerations to join Minnesota and Wisconsin 
in following the single comparison rule.213  Colorado relied on slightly 
different “fairness” considerations to reach the opposite result and adopt 
the aggregation rule.214  In the Idaho case, the plaintiff was 25% at fault 
and one defendant was 10% at fault, while the other defendant was 65% 
at fault.215  The court noted that if the aggregation rule were followed, the 
10%-at-fault defendant could be liable for 75% of the 25%-at-fault 
plaintiff’s damages, a result the court considered unfair to the 10%-at-
fault defendant.216  The court further noted that, under Idaho’s 49% rule 
of modified comparative fault, in a case in which the plaintiff and the 
only defendant were each 50% at fault, the plaintiff would be barred.217  
Yet if the plaintiff and the two defendants in a case were each one-third 
at fault, the aggregation rule would produce the “incongruous” result of 
permitting the plaintiff to recover two-thirds of his damages even though, 
again, the plaintiff’s fault is equal to, not less than, the fault of each 
defendant.218 
Ironically, the Colorado case involved the exact facts used 
hypothetically three years earlier by the Idaho court—a plaintiff one-
                                                                                                                       
negligence of the defendant or defendants”). 
 210. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
258a(a) (2005 & Supp. 2010); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-2-6 (West 2011) (“all persons”); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.141(1) (West 2005) (“the parties”). 
 211. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (2010); 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) 
(West 2007); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (2003) (“all persons who contributed to the 
alleged injury”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-818 (West 2009) (“any defendant or group of 
defendants”). 
 212. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111(1) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-801 (West 
2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 2006). 
 213. Oldenwalt v. Zaring, 624 P.2d 383, 388 (Idaho 1980). 
 214. Mountain Mobile Mix v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883, 890 (Colo. 1983). 
 215. Odenwalt, 624 P.2d at 384. 
 216. Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, the plaintiff would be liable for his own 
10% and also for the other defendant’s 65% or 75% of the total damages.  Id. at 387. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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third at fault and each of the two defendants also one-third at fault.219  
The court noted that its 49% rule would allow a 45%-at-fault plaintiff to 
recover 55% of his damages from a 55%-at-fault defendant.220  By 
contrast, if the single comparison rule were adopted, a 20%-at-fault 
plaintiff would recover nothing from any of four defendants who were 
each 20% at fault.221  In the court’s opinion, the Colorado legislature 
enacted the 49% rule of modified comparative fault to ameliorate the 
harshness of the old contributory negligence rule, to apportion losses 
more equitably, but to preserve the principle that “plaintiffs should not 
recover damages that they caused to themselves.”222  Only when the 
plaintiff’s fault exceeds the 49% or 50% cutoff point are the damages 
considered to be damages that the plaintiff caused to himself. 
The differing views of fairness derive from how each court 
approached the application of modified comparative fault to the issue of 
fairness.  The Idaho court viewed the issue through the eyes of a 
defendant: unfairness is when a defendant would be required to pay 
damages to a plaintiff who was more at fault than the defendant without 
regard to the plaintiff’s share of the total fault in the case.223  The 
Colorado court viewed the issue through the eyes of a plaintiff: 
unfairness is when a plaintiff would be barred from recovery despite 
having been less than 50% at fault.224  The merit of either view of 
fairness depends on the underlying meaning and importance of the 49% 
and 50% cutoff points, but neither opinion added any persuasive reason 
for having these cutoff points.225 
Fortunately, the proposed 83.7% rule of modified comparative fault 
completely avoids the problem of choosing between the single 
comparison rule and the aggregation rule.  The 83.7% rule simply 
                                                     
 219. Mountain Mobile Mix, 660 P.2d at 884. 
 220. Id. at 888. 
 221. Id. at 888–89; see also Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 909–10 
(Utah 1984) (posing the same hypothetical situation). 
 222. Mountain Mobile Mix, 660 P.2d at 888. 
 223. Under this view, it would be unfair in a 49% rule state for a 10%-at-fault plaintiff to recover 
damages from a 10%-at-fault defendant even though the defendants collectively caused 90% of the 
total damages. 
 224. Under this view, it would be unfair in a 50% rule state to bar a 50%-at-fault plaintiff from 
recovering damages from a 5%-at-fault defendant. 
 225. As courts have noted, the unfairness in certain situations arising under the aggregation rule 
invariably relates to the legal effects of joint and several liability rather than the legal effects of the 
aggregation rule.  See, e.g., Mountain Mobile Mix, 660 P.2d at 888.  One jurist noted that the 
unfairness derives from the specter of the judgment-proof defendant, which under joint and several 
liability would burden the solvent defendant with the entire loss.  See, e.g., Oldenwalt v. Zaring, 624 
P.2d 383, 393–94 (Idaho 1980) (Bistline, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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provides that any plaintiff whose fault exceeds 83.7% of the total fault in 
the case is completely barred from any recovery.  Conversely, any 
plaintiff whose fault is 83.7% or less of the total fault may recover a 
proportionate fault share of his damages.  How the remaining fault is 
divided among the defendants is irrelevant.  For example, if the plaintiff 
is 80% at fault and the two defendants are each 10% at fault, the plaintiff 
may recover 20% from either of the defendants in a state using joint and 
several liability or 10% from each of the defendants in a state using 
proportionate liability.  The plaintiff’s fault does not exceed 83.7% of the 
total fault, and therefore he is not barred from recovery.226 
V. THE BENEFITS OF THE TWO-WAY PROVISION 
The proposed 83.7% system applies equally to plaintiffs and 
defendants.227  A defendant whose fault exceeds 83.7% is barred from 
seeking a comparative fault reduction of the damages based on the 
minimal fault of the plaintiff in the same manner that the plaintiff whose 
fault exceeds 83.7% is barred from any recovery.  The rationale is 
straightforward: any condemnation or punishment of an extremely high 
level of fault and any insistence upon personal responsibility or 
accountability for one’s actions should apply equally regardless of a 
party’s designation as a plaintiff or a defendant. 
In addition, the highly culpable defendant would be jointly and 
severally liable for any share of fault attributed to another defendant and 
would be barred from seeking comparative contribution or equitable 
indemnity from any other defendant.  Any other defendant would be less 
than 16.3% at fault and thus would be entitled to protection from 
litigation as a minimally-at-fault party.  For example, assume that the 
plaintiff is 5% at fault, defendant A is 85% at fault, defendant B is 10% at 
fault, and the total damages are $100,000.  The plaintiff would be 
                                                     
 226. This approach of asking only whether the plaintiff’s share of the total fault is above or 
below the statutory cutoff point is similar to the situation in Illinois, Texas, and Wyoming.  In each 
state’s statute creating the 50% rule of modified comparative negligence, the statute required that the 
plaintiff’s fault be not more than 50% of the total fault.  See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116(c) 
(West 2003); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (West 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-
109(b) (West 2007).  The comparison with a specific fault percentage rather than with the fault of 
another party or parties renders the choice between the aggregation rule and the separate comparison 
rule unnecessary. 
 227. None of the existing modified comparative fault statutes have any provision penalizing the 
highly culpable defendant.  In every modified comparative fault state, the defendant who is 95% at 
fault may assert a comparative fault defense for the purpose of reducing his liability by 5%.  See 
supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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allowed to recover the entire $100,000 from defendant A.  Defendant A 
would not be allowed to seek comparative contribution or equitable 
indemnity from defendant B. 
However, if defendant A is unable to pay all or any of the $100,000, 
the plaintiff should be allowed to maintain a claim against defendant B, 
but only for his proportionate fault share of the damages.  Because 
defendant A will be attributed with the overwhelming majority of the 
total fault in the case, any fault attributed to either the plaintiff or another 
defendant would be minor—less than 16.3%.  The interest in judicial 
economy should justify protecting these parties from inappropriate 
litigation brought by a highly culpable party.  On the other hand, judicial 
economy should not operate to prevent the plaintiff from seeking partial 
redress from a defendant when the fault of each is minor and the highly 
culpable defendant cannot satisfy the entire judgment.  Thus, in the 
above example, the 5%-at-fault plaintiff should be allowed to recover 
10% of his damages, or $10,000, from defendant B if defendant A cannot 
satisfy the judgment.228 
In one sense, the two-way provision should not be viewed as either 
unique or unduly burdensome.  Under the former all-or-nothing system, a 
form of a two-way system was developing.  As the number of exceptions 
to the complete bar of contributory negligence kept increasing, 
defendants were increasingly put in the position of paying the entire cost 
of accidents in which they were more at fault than the plaintiff. 229 
Imposing the entire cost of an accident on only those defendants whose 
fault was more than 83.7% would be far less burdensome on defendants 
than the rule that was starting to emerge under the all-or-nothing system. 
These provisions are rational and consistent.  The 83.7% system is 
designed to promote judicial economy by imposing slightly 
disproportionate burdens on the highly culpable party.  Nothing in the 
proposal is intended to burden unnecessarily the minimally at fault 
parties.  One policy rationale developed in the all-or-nothing system was 
the policy that judicial process should not be available to aid a 
wrongdoer.230  This policy could be readily adapted to the proposed 
treatment of the highly culpable defendant by indicating that judicial 
                                                     
 228. This treatment of the minimally culpable defendant is similar to a provision in a former 
version of a New Jersey statute applying proportionate liability to any defendant 20% or less at fault.  
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.3 (1987) (amended 1995).  However, unlike the New Jersey statute, 
the proposed provision is conditional and would apply only if the highly culpable other defendant 
was unable to pay all of the judgment. 
 229. See supra Part II.A. 
 230. See supra note 4. 
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process will not be available to aid the highly culpable wrongdoer, 
whether a plaintiff or a defendant. 
Perhaps the most important benefit of the two-way provision is its 
capacity to motivate conflicting interests in a legislature to compromise 
on a cutoff number closer to the high end, such as my proposed 83.7%, 
rather than a number at the low end, such as the 60% cutoff formerly 
applicable to strict liability actions in Texas.231  In the one-way approach 
used in all existing modified comparative fault systems, defense interests 
have nothing to lose by insisting on a number closer to 50%.  With the 
two-way feature, however, a low cutoff number puts defendant at risk of 
paying the entire liability in cases in which his fault only slightly exceeds 
the cutoff number.  The risk of paying everything might move states 
closer to pure comparative fault, but with protection against abuse by 
highly culpable plaintiffs. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I would not expect any state to adopt my proposed 83.7% system of 
modified comparative fault.  The 83.7% number was intentionally 
chosen to appear totally arbitrary for purposes of a classroom exercise.  
The number notwithstanding, however, the proposal for a much higher 
cutoff number—perhaps 75%, 80%, or 85%—governing the reversion to 
all-or-nothing treatment is far less arbitrary than the existing 49% or 50% 
rules.  Those rules have no justification other than a concept of personal 
responsibility that originated in an earlier era without the option of 
sharing losses between two negligent parties.  The fear of highly culpable 
plaintiffs bringing claims against minimally culpable defendants is 
overstated and, in any event, a problem that can be easily cured with less 
draconian measures, such as a cutoff point well above 50% but less than 
90%. 
In addition to the elimination of the discriminatory treatment of 
parties whose faults are either identical or essentially similar, the 
proposal provides an equitable option for loss allocation in two-injury 
accidents that simply does not exist under the existing systems of 
modified comparative fault.  Two-injury highway accidents constitute a 
significant share of the modern accident problem.  It seems 
unconscionable for the tort system to provide no effective means of 
allocating those losses equitably.  Pure comparative fault would 
completely solve the problem, but a high cutoff for modified 
                                                     
 231. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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comparative fault would extend equitable loss allocation to the 
substantial majority of two-injury cases and impose only a relatively 
minor distortion of equitable loss allocation on the remaining cases.  
Finally, the higher cutoff point largely eliminates the need to instruct 
juries on the legal effects of their fault findings, and it completely 
eliminates any problem with a comparison of the plaintiff’s fault with the 
fault of multiple tortfeasors. 
Finally, the two-way provision provides pressure on defendants to 
accept the higher cutoff point.  Once it is made clear to defendants that 
the same intolerance of high culpability will be imposed on them as on 
plaintiffs, I suspect defendants will find a high cutoff point preferable to 
bearing the entire loss in cases in which they are only slightly more at 
fault than the plaintiff. 
